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IN  THE  EARLY 1980s, the Keynesian view of business cycles was in 
trouble.  The  problem  was not new empirical  evidence against  Keynesian 
theories, but weakness in the theories themselves.' According to the 
Keynesian  view, fluctuations  in output  arise largely  from  fluctuations  in 
nominal  aggregate  demand.  These changes in demand  have real effects 
because nominal  wages and  prices are  rigid.  But in Keynesian  models  of 
the  1970s, the crucial nominal rigidities were assumed rather than 
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1. Keynesian  models  of wage and  price  adjustment  based  on Phillips  curves provided 
poor  fits  to the  data  of the early-to-mid-  1970s.  But  subsequent  modifications  of the models, 
such as the addition  of supply shocks, have led to fairly good performances.  See the 
discussions irn  Olivier J. Blanchard,  "Why Does Money Affect Output?  A Survey," 
Working  Paper  2285  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June 1987);  and Robert  J. 
Gordon, "Postwar Developments in Business Cycle Theory: An Unabashedly  New- 
Keynesian  Perspective,"  Keynote  Lecture, 18th  CIRET  Conference,  Zurich,  September 
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explained-assumed  directly, as in disequilibrium models, or introduced 
through  theoretically  arbitrary assumptions  about  labor  contracts.2 
Indeed, it was clearly in the interests of agents to eliminate the rigidities 
they were assumed to create. If wages, for example,  were set above the 
market-clearing level,  firms could increase  profits by reducing wages. 
Microeconomics  teaches  us to reject models in which, as Robert Lucas 
puts it, "there are $500 bills on the sidewalk."  Thus the 1970s and early 
1980s saw  many economists  turn away  from Keynesian  theories  and 
toward new classical models with flexible wages and prices. 
But Keynesian  economics  has made much progress in the past few 
years. Recent research has produced models in which optimizing agents 
choose to create nominal rigidities. This accomplishment derives largely 
from a central insight: nominal rigidities, and hence  the real effects  of 
nominal demand shocks, can be large even if the frictions preventing full 
nominal flexibility are slight. Seemingly minor aspects of the economy, 
such as costs of price adjustment and the asynchronized  timing of price 
changes by different firms, can explain large nonneutralities. 
Theoretical demonstrations that Keynesian models can be reconciled 
with microeconomics  do not constitute  proof that Keynesian  theories 
are correct. Indeed, a weakness  of recent models of nominal rigidities is 
that  they  do  not  appear  to  have  novel  empirical  implications.  As 
Lawrence Summers argues: 
While  words  like menu  costs and  overlapping  contracts  are often heard,  little if 
any empirical  work has demonstrated  connection between the extent of these 
phenomena  and  the pattern  of cyclical fluctuations.  It is difficult  to think  of any 
anomalies that Keynesian research in the "nominal rigidities" tradition  has 
resolved, or of any new phenomena  that  it has rendered  comprehensible.3 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  evidence  supporting  new 
Keynesian  theories.  We  point  out  a  simple  prediction  of  Keynesian 
2.  For disequilibrium  models, see Robert  J. Barro  and Herschel I. Grossman, "A 
General  Disequilibrium  Model  of Income  and  Employment,"  Anmerican  Economic  Review, 
vol. 61 (March 1971), pp. 82-93; and E.  Malinvaud,  The Theoty of  Uneniplovment 
Reconsidered  (Basil  Blackwell, 1977).  For contract  models, see Stanley  Fischer, "Long- 
Term  Contracts,  Rational  Expectations  and  the Optimal  Money  Supply  Rule,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy, vol. 85 (February 1977), pp.  191-205; and Jo Anna Gray, "On 
Indexation  and  Contract  Length,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 86 (February  1978), 
pp. 1-18. 
3. Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Should  Keynesian  Economics  Dispense  with the Phillips 
Curve?" in Rod Cross, ed.,  Unemployment, Hysteresis,  and the Natural Rate Hypothesis 
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models  that  contradicts  other  leading  macroeconomic  theories  and  show 
that it holds in actual economies. In doing so, we point out a "new 
phenomenon"  that Keynesian  theories "render  comprehensible." 
The prediction  that  we test concerns  the effects of steady  inflation.  In 
Keynesian models, nominal  shocks have real effects because nominal 
prices change infrequently.  An increase in the average  rate of inflation 
causes firms  to adjust  prices more frequently  to keep up with the rising 
price  level. In turn,  more  frequent  price  changes  imply  that  prices adjust 
more quickly  to nominal  shocks, and thus that the shocks have smallel 
real effects. We test this prediction  by examining  the relation  between 
average  inflation  and the size of the real effects of nominal  shocks both 
across countries and over time. We measure the effects of nominal 
shocks by the slope of the short-run  Phillips  curve. 
Other  prominent  macroeconomic  theories  do not predict  that  average 
inflation  affects  the slope  of the Phillips  curve.  In  particular,  ourempirical 
work provides a sharp  test between the Keynesian explanation  for the 
Phillips curve and the leading new classical alternative, the Lucas 
imperfect  information  model.4  Indeed, one goal of this paper  is to redo 
Lucas's famous  analysis  and dramatically  reinterpret  his results. Lucas 
and later authors show that countries with highly variable aggregate 
demand have steep Phillips curves. That is, nominal shocks in these 
countries have little effect on output. Lucas interprets  this finding  as 
evidence that highly variable demand reduces the perceived relative 
price changes resulting  from nominal  shocks. We provide a Keynesian 
interpretation  of Lucas's result:  more  variable  demand,  like  high  average 
inflation,  leads to more frequent price adjustment.  We then test the 
differing implications of the two theories for the effects of average 
inflation.  Our  results are consistent with the Keynesian  explanation  for 
the Phillips  curve and  inconsistent  with the classical explanation. 
In addition  to providing  evidence about  macroeconomic  theories, our 
finding  that  average  inflation  affects the short-run  output-inflation  trade- 
off is important  for policy. For example, it is likely that the trade-off 
facing  policymakers  in the United States has changed  as a consequence 
of disinflation  in the 1980s. Our estimates imply that a reduction in 
4.  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Expectations  and the Neutrality  of Money," Jolurnal of 
Economic  Theory,  vol. 4 (April  1972),  pp. 103-24;  Lucas, "Some International  Evidence 
on Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs,"  American  Economic Review, vol. 63 (June 1973), pp. 
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average inflation  from 10 percent to 5 percent substantially  alters the 
short-run  impact  of aggregate  demand. 
The body of the paper consists of three major sections. The first 
discusses the new research that provides microeconomic  foundations 
for  Keynesian  theories.  The  second  presents  a  model  of price  adjustment. 
It demonstrates  the connection  between average  inflation  and the slope 
of the Phillips curve and contrasts this result with the predictions of 
other theories. The third  section provides both cross-country  and time 
series evidence that supports  the predictions  of the model. 
New Keynesian Theories 
According  to Keynesian  economics, fluctuations  in employment  and 
output  arise  largely  from  fluctuations  in nominal  aggregate  demand.  The 
reason that nominal  shocks matter  is that nominal  wages and prices are 
not fully flexible.  These views are  the basis for conventional  accounts  of 
macroeconomic  events. For  example,  the consensus explanation  for the 
1982  recession is slow growth in nominal  demand  resulting  from tight 
monetary  policy. The research  program  described  here is modest in the 
sense that it seeks to strengthen  the foundations  of this conventional 
thinking,  not to provide a new theory of fluctuations.  In particular,  its 
goal is to answer  the theoretical  question  of how nominal  rigidities  arise 
from optimizing  behavior, since the absence of an answer in the 1970s 
was largely  responsible  for the decline of Keynesian  economics. 
In the following discussion we first describe the central  point of the 
recent  literature:  large  nominal  rigidities  are  possible  even if the frictions 
preventing  full nominal flexibility are small. We next describe some 
phenomena  that  greatly  strengthen  the basic argument,  including  rigidi- 
ties in real wages and  prices and  asynchronized  timing  of price changes. 
We then discuss two innovations in recent models that are largely 
responsible  for their success: the introduction  of imperfect  competition 
and  an emphasis  on price as well as wage rigidity.  Finally,  we argue  that 
the ideas in recent work are indispensable  for a plausible Keynesian 
account of fluctuations.5 
5. Some of the ideas of this literature  are discussed informally  by earlier  Keynesian 
authors.  To cite just two examples, see the discussion  of asynchronized  timing  of price 
changes in Robert J. Gordon, "Output  Fluctuations  and Gradual  Price Adjustment," Laurence  Ball, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and David Romner  5 
SMALL  NOMINAL  FRICTIONS  AND  LARGE  NOMINAL  RIGIDITlES 
The recent literature  on nominal rigidities enters an argument  that 
Keynesians  appeared  to be losing. Members  of the new classical school 
that developed in the  1970s challenged Keynesians to  explain the 
rigidities in Keynesian models. In response, Keynesians sometimes 
cited costs of adjusting  prices. But as the classicals pointed out, these 
costs, while surely present, appear  small. Indeed, the frequently  men- 
tioned "menu  costs"-the  costs of printing  new menus and catalogs, of 
replacing  price tags, and so on-sound  trivial.  Thus the impediments  to 
nominal  flexibility in actual economies appear too small to provide a 
foundation  for Keynesian models. 
A common but mistaken response is that there are many obvious 
sources of large wage and price rigidities:  implicit  contracts, customer 
markets,  efficiency  wages, insider-outsider  relationships,  and  so on. The 
problem is that these phenomena imply rigidities in real  wages and 
prices, while the Keynesian theory depends on rigidities in nominal 
wages  and  prices. Real  rigidities  are  no impediment  to complete  flexibility 
of nominal  prices, because full adjustment  to a nominal  shock does not 
require  any change in real prices. The absence of models of nominal 
rigidity  reflects the microeconomic  proposition  that agents do not care 
about nominal magnitudes. The only apparent departures  from this 
proposition  in actual economies are the small costs of nominal  adjust- 
ment. 
Thus recent work begins with the premise that it is inexpensive to 
reduce nominal rigidity  and asks how substantial  rigidity  nonetheless 
arises. The central answer of the literature  is presented by Mankiw, 
Akerlof  and Yellen, Blanchard  and Kiyotaki, and Ball and Romer.6 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol.  19 (June 1981), pp. 493-530,  and the discussion  of 
externalities  from  nominal  rigidity  in Charles  L. -Schultze,  "Microeconomic  Efficiency 
and Nominal Wage Stickiness," American  Economic Review, vol. 75 (March 1985), 
pp. 1-1  5. 
6. N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "Small  Menu  Costs and  Large  Business  Cycles:  A Macroec- 
onomic  Model  of Monopoly,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 100  (May 1985),  pp. 
529-37;  George  A. Akerlof  and  Janet  L. Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model  of the Business 
Cycle, with Wage  and Price Inertia,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 100  (1985, 
Supplement),  pp. 823-38;  Olivier  Jean  Blanchard  and  Nobuhiro  Kiyotaki,  "Monopolistic 
Competition  and  the Effects  of Aggregate  Demand,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 77 
(September  1987),  pp.  647-66;  Laurence  Ball  and  David  Romer,  "Are  Prices  Too Sticky?" 
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Second-Order Private Costs and First-Order  Business Cycles.  Mankiw 
and Akerlof  and Yellen make a simple  but important  point. They study 
imperfectly  competitive economies and show that the cost of nominal 
rigidities  to price setters can be much smaller  than the macroeconomic 
effects. An example  that  illustrates  the cost to price setters is a firm  that 
initially  sets its price at the profit-maximizing  level but does not adjust 
after the money supply falls. We let -r(-)  denote the firm's  profits  as a 
function  of its price and let P be the firm's  predetermined  price and P* 
its profit-maximizing  price, which it would set if it adjusted. Using a 
Taylor expansion, we can approximate  the firm's profit  loss from not 
adjusting  as 
(1)  IT(P*)  -  i,(P)  U'(p*)(p* 
-  P) 
-  1i T"  (P*)(P* 
-  P)2.  2 
But since P* maximizes  profits,  -a'(P*)  is zero. Thus the profit  loss from 
nonadjustment  is second order-that  is, proportional  to the square of 
(P* -  P). As long as the predetermined  price is close to the profit- 
maximizing  price, the cost of price rigidity  to the firm  is small. 
But rigidity  can have first-order  macroeconomic  effects. An increase 
in nominal  money  with  nominal  prices  fixed  leads to a first-order  increase 
in real aggregate  demand,  and hence in real output. For example, if the 
aggregate  demand  curve is simply Y = MIP, rigid  prices imply  a change 
in output  proportional  to the change  in money. 
The effect on social welfare is also first order, as follows from the 
assumption  of imperfect  competition.  Under  imperfect  competition,  the 
profit-maximizing  price is socially suboptimal.  The price  is too high  and 
output  is too low. Thus at P* the first  derivative  of welfare  with respect 
to the firm's  price is negative:  welfare would rise if the piice fell below 
P*. Nonadjustment  to a fall in money implies P greater  than  P*; given 
the negative  first  derivative  of welfare, the welfare  loss is first  order. 
Because the cost of rigidity  to a price setter  is second order  while the 
macroeconomic  effects are first order, the latter can be much larger. 
This finding  resolves the puzzle of why price setters refuse to incur  the 
small  costs of reducing  the business cycle through  more  flexible  prices. 
Despite the large macroeconomic effects, the private incentives are 
small. 
Aggregate  Demand  Externalities.  Blanchard and Kiyotaki  provide 
an important  interpretation  of the result  in Mankiw  and  Akerlof-Yellen: Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregoty Mankiw, and David Romer  7 
the macroeconomic  effects of nominal  rigidity  differ from the private 
costs because rigidity  has an "aggregate  demand  externality." A few 
equations  make  this clear. Suppose the demand  for the product  of firm  i 
depends  on aggregate  spending  and  on the firm's  relative  price: 
(2)  Y=  (p)  Y 
For simplicity,  aggregate  demand  is given by a quantity  equation7 
(3)  y  M 
P 
Combining  equations  2 and 3 yields 
(4) 
Y  (p)(p 
E 
According  to equation  4, firm  i's demand  depends on its relative price 
and on real money, which determines  aggregate  demand. Changes in 
real money shift the demand curve facing firm i, and the firm's price 
determines  its position  on the demand  curve. 
If M falls and  firm  i does not adjust,  the second-order  cost to firm  i is 
that PilP  does not adjust to  the new profit-maximizing  level.  The 
externality  is that rigidity  in firm  i's price contributes  to rigidity  in the 
aggregate  price level. Given the fall in nominal money, rigidity in P 
implies a first-order  fall in real money, which reduces demand  for all 
firms'  goods. In other  words, there  is an externality  because adjustment 
of all prices  would  prevent  a fall in real  aggregate  demand,  but each firm 
is a small part of the economy and thus ignores this macroeconomic 
benefit. 
The importance  of the externality  is illustrated  by a firm  in a recession 
caused  by tight  money. To the firm,  the recession means  an inward  shift 
of its demand  curve and a resulting  first-order  loss in profits. The firm 
would very much  like to shift its demand  curve back out, but of course 
it cannot do so by changing  its price. Instead, price adjustment  would 
yield only the second-order  gain  from  optimally  dividing  the losses from 
7. The only essential  feature  of equation  3 is the negative  relation  between Y  and  P. 
We can interpret  M as simply  a shift  term  in the aggregate  demand  equation.  Thus, as we 
discuss below, the results  in recent  papers  concern  the effects of any shock to aggregate 
demand,  not  just changes  in the money  stock. 8  Br-ookinigs  Papers on Economnic  Activity, 1:1988 
the recession between reduced sales and a lower price. The recession 
would end and everyone would be much better off if all firms  adjusted. 
But each firm  believes that  it cannot  end the recession and  therefore  may 
fail to adjust  even if the costs of adjustment  are much smaller  than the 
costs of the recession. 
This argument  resembles  standard  microeconomic  analyses of exter- 
nalities. Consider  the classic example of pollution. Pollution  would be 
greatly reduced, and social welfare greatly improved, if each person 
incurred  the small  cost of walking  to the trash  can at the end of the block. 
But each individual  ignores this when he throws his wrapper  on the 
street  because he is only one of many  polluters.  Because of externalities, 
economists  do not find  highly  inefficient  levels of pollution  puzzling  even 
though the costs of reducing  pollution are small. For similar  reasons, 
highly  inefficient  nominal  rigidities  are not a mystery  even though  menu 
costs are small. 
Externalities from Fluctuations  in Demand.  Keynesians  believe  not 
only that shocks to nominal  aggregate  demand  cause large  fluctuations 
in output  and  welfare,  but  also that  these fluctuations  are  inefficient,  and 
thus that stabilization  of demand  is desirable.  The models surveyed so 
far do not provide a foundation for this view. As explained above, 
nonadjustment  of prices to a fall in demand  leads to large  reductions  in 
output and welfare. But nonadjustment  to a rise in demand leads to 
higher  output and, because output is initially  too low under imperfect 
competition,  to higher  welfare. Thus the implications  of fluctuations  for 
average welfare, and  hence the desirability  of reducing  fluctuations,  are 
unclear.  Indeed,  Ball  and  Romer  show that  the first-order  welfare  effects 
of fluctuations  average  to zero, which means  that  the first  order-second 
order  distinction  is irrelevant  to this issue.8 
Nonetheless, Ball and  Romer  show, by comparing  the average  social 
and private costs of nominal  rigidity, that small nominal  frictions are 
sufficient  for large reductions in average welfare. The private cost is 
fluctuations  of a firm's  relative  price  around  the profit-maximizing  level. 
The social cost is the private cost plus the cost of fluctuations  in real 
aggregate  demand.  Greater  flexibility  would stabilize real demand,  but 
each firm  ignores  its effect on the variance  of demand,  just as it ignores 
its effect on the level of demand  after  a given shock. Although  both the 
8. Ball  and  Romer,  "Are Prices  Too Sticky?" Laiurence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romner-  9 
average social and average private costs are second order, Ball and 
Romer  show  that  the  former  may  be  much  larger:  fluctuations  in  aggregate 
demand  can be much  more  costly than  fluctuations  in relative  prices. As 
a result,  small  frictions  can  prevent  firms  from  adopting  greater  flexibility 
even if business  cycles are highly  inefficient. 
STILL  LARGER  RIGIDITIES 
The papers discussed so far establish that nominal  rigidities  can be 
far  larger  than  the frictions  that  cause them. But as we now describe, the 
simple  models  in these papers  cannot  fully explain  nonneutralities  of the 
size and persistence observed in actual  economies. Therefore,  we turn 
to more complicated  models that incorporate  realistic  phenomena  that 
magnify  nominal  rigidities.  These phenomena  include rigidities  in real 
wages and  prices  and  asynchronized  timing  of price  changes  by different 
firms. 
Real  Rigidities.  As  we  argue  above,  real  rigidities  alone  are  no 
impediment  to full nominal  flexibility.  But Ball and Romer show that a 
high  degree  of real  rigidity,  defined  as small  responses of real  wages and 
real  prices to changes  in real demand,  greatly  increases the nonneutral- 
ities arising  from small  nominal  frictions.9 
This finding is important  because, although models with nominal 
frictions but no real rigidities  can in principle  produce large nominal 
rigidities, they do  so  only for implausible parameter values. Most 
important,  large rigidities arise only if labor supply is highly elastic, 
while labor supply elasticities in actual economies appear small. The 
role of labor supply is illustrated by a hypothetical economy with 
imperfect competition and menu costs  in the goods market but a 
Walrasian  labor  market.  If menu  costs led to nominal  price  rigidity,  then 
nominal  shocks would cause large shifts in labor demand. But if labor 
supply were inelastic, these shifts in labor demand  would cause large 
changes in the real wage and thereby create large incentives for price 
setters to adjust  their  prices. As a result, nominal  rigidity  would not be 
an equilibrium. 
While  for plausible  parameter  values nominal  frictions  alone produce 
little nominal  rigidity,  Ball and Romer show that considerable  rigidity 
9.  Laurence Ball and David Romer, "Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality  of 
Money," Working  Paper  2476  (NBER, December  1987). 10  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
can arise if the frictions are combined  with real rigidities  arising  from 
efficiency  wages, customer  markets,  and  the like. For example, substan- 
tial nominal  rigidity  can arise from a combination  of real rigidity  in the 
labor market  and imperfect  competition  and menu costs in the goods 
market.  If firms  pay efficiency  wages, for instance, then real  wages may 
be set above the market-clearing  level, so that  workers  are  off their  labor 
supply  curves. In this situation  a fall in labor  demand  can greatly  reduce 
employment  without a large  fall in the real wage even if labor supply  is 
inelastic. 
The importance  of real rigidities  for explaining  nominal  rigidities  is 
not settled, because there is  no consensus about the sources and 
magnitudes  of real  rigidities  in actual  economies. In particular,  phenom- 
ena like efficiency  wages and  customer  markets  increase  nominal  rigidity 
to the extent that they reduce desired responses of real wages and real 
prices to demand  shifts, but economists are still unsure  of the sizes of 
these effects. Further  research on real rigidities will lead to a better 
understanding  of nominal  rigidities. 
Staggered  Price  Setting.  Even when real rigidities  are added, the 
models surveyed so far cannot fully explain the size and persistence of 
the real  effects of nominal  shocks. In these models, the effects of shocks 
are eliminated  when nominal  prices adjust.  In actual  economies, reces- 
sions following severe demand  contractions  can last for several years, 
and  while  individual  prices  are  fixed  for  substantial  periods,  these periods 
are generally  shorter  than  several  years. Thus models  with sticky prices 
must  explain  why the  effects of shocks  persist  after  all  prices  are  changed. 
An explanation  is provided  by the literature  on staggered  price  setting, 
which shows that  if firms  change  prices  at different  times, the adjustment 
of the aggregate  price  level to shocks can take much  longer  than  the time 
between  adjustments  of each individual  price.  10  The "price  level inertia" 
caused by staggering  implies that nominal shocks can have large and 
long-lasting  real  effects even if individual  prices change  frequently. 
10. John  B. Taylor,  "Staggered  Wage  Setting  in  a Macro  Model,"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 69 (May 1979, Papers andProceedings,  1978), pp. 108-13; Taylor, "Aggregate 
Dynamics  and Staggered  Contracts,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 88 (February 
1980),  pp. 1-23;  Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "Price  Asynchronization  and  Price  Level Inertia," 
in  Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Mario  Henrique  Simonsen,  eds., Inflation,  Debt, andIndexation 
(MIT  Press, 1983),  pp. 3-24; Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "The Wage Price Spiral," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,  vol.  101 (August 1986), pp. 543-65. Lauirence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer  11 
A simple  example makes clear the importance  of the timing  of price 
changes. Suppose  first  that  every firm  adjusts  its price  on the first  of each 
month, so that price setting is synchronized.  If the money supply falls 
on June 10, output  is reduced  from June 10 to July 1, because nominal 
prices are fixed during  this period. But on July 1 all prices adjust in 
proportion  to the fall in money, and the recession ends. 
Now suppose  that  half  of all firms  set prices on the first  of each month 
and half on the fifteenth.  If the money supply  falls on June 10, then on 
June 15  half the firms  have an opportunity  to adjust  their  prices. But in 
this case they may choose to make little adjustment.  Because half of all 
nominal prices remain fixed, adjustment  of the other prices implies 
changes in relative  prices, which firms  may not want. (In contrast, if all 
prices change simultaneously,  full nominal  adjustment  does not affect 
relative  prices.) If the June 15  price setters make little adjustment,  then 
the other firms  make little adjustment  when their turn  comes on July 1, 
because they do not desire relative  price changes  either.  And so on. The 
price level declines slowly as the result of small decreases every first 
and fifteenth,  and the real effects of the fall in money die out slowly. In 
short, price adjustment  is slow because neither  group  of firms  is willing 
to be the first  to make  large  cuts.  11 
As Blanchard  emphasizes, if staggering  occurs among  firms  at differ- 
ent points in a chain of production, its effects are strengthened.12 A 
11. A natural  question  is why firms  change  prices  at different  times  if this exacerbates 
aggregate  fluctuations.  One obvious answer is that different firms receive shocks at 
different  times and face different  costs of price adjustment.  Laurence  Ball and David 
Romer, "The Equilibrium  and Optimal  Timing  of Price Changes,"  Working  Paper  2412 
(NBER, October  1987),  show that,  because  of externalities  from  staggering,  idiosyncratic 
shocks can lead to staggering  even if synchronized  price setting is Pareto  superior.  But 
idiosyncratic  shocks  cannot  explain  all staggering.  For  example,  some  firms  with  two-year 
labor  contracts  set wages in even years  and some set them  in odd years, and  this does not 
correspond  to deterministic  two-year  cycles in the arrival  of shocks. Another  explanation 
for staggering  is that it arises from firms' efforts to gain information.  This source of 
staggering is discussed  in Arthur M.  Okun, Prices  and  Quantities:  A Macroeconomic 
Analysis  (Brookings,  1981),  and  formalized  in Laurence  Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti, 
"Imperfect  Information  and  Staggered  Price  Setting,"  Working  Paper  2201  (NBER, April 
1987).  For example,  a firm  wants to set wages in line with the wages of other  firms.  If all 
wages are set simultaneously,  each firm  is unsure  of what  wage to set because  it does not 
know what others will do. This gives each firm  an incentive  to set its wage shortly  after 
the others. The desire  of each firm  to "bat last," as Okun  puts it, can lead in equilibrium 
to a uniform  distribution  of signing  dates. 
12. Blanchard,  "Price  Asynchronization." 12  Brookings  Paipers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1988 
firm's  profit-maximizing  price is tied to both the prices of its inputs  and 
the prices of goods for which its product  is an input  (the latter  influence 
demand  for the firm's  product).  Thus a firm  does not want to adjust  its 
price to a shock if these other  prices  do not adjust  at the same time. This 
reluctance  to make  asynchronized  adjustments  causes  price  level inertia. 
Blanchard  shows that  the degree  of inertia  increases  the longer  the chain 
of production:  it takes a long time  for the gradual  adjustment  of prices  to 
make  its way through  a complicated  system. 
The literature  on staggered  price  setting  complements  that  on nominal 
rigidities  arising  from  menu  costs. The degree  of rigidity  in the aggregate 
price level depends on both the frequency  and the timing  of individual 
price changes. Menu costs cause prices to adjust infrequently.  For a 
given frequency of individual  adjustment,  staggering  slows the adjust- 
ment of the price level. Large  aggregate  rigidities  can thus be explained 
by a combination  of staggering  and nominal  frictions:  the former  mag- 
nifies  the rigidities  arising  from  the latter. 
Asymmetric Effects ofDemand  Shocks.  We conclude this part of our 
discussion by mentioning  a little-explored  possibility for strengthening 
Keynesian  models. The models surveyed  imply  symmetric  responses of 
the  economy  to rises  and  falls  in  nominal  aggregate  demand.  For  example, 
in menu  cost models  the range  of shocks to which prices do not adjust  is 
symmetric  around  zero, and  so is the range  of possible  changes  in output. 
But traditional  Keynesian models often imply asymmetric effects of 
demand  shifts.  In  undergraduate  texts, for  example,  the aggregate  supply 
curve is often drawn so that decreases in demand  lead to large output 
losses while  the effects of increases  are  mostly  dissipated  through  higher 
prices. Such asymmetries are intuitively appealing, and they greatly 
strengthen  the Keynesian view that demand stabilization  is desirable: 
stabilization  raises the average  levels of output  and employment  as well 
as reducing  the variances. It is unclear  whether  plausible  modifications 
of new Keynesian  models  can  produce  asymmetries.  Asymmetric  effects 
of shocks could arise from asymmetric  price rigidity-prices  that are 
sticky downward  but not upward-but this is another  appealing  notion 
that  is difficult  to formalize.  3 
13. Timur  Kuran  shows that  asymmetries  in firms'  profit  functions,  which  many  menu 
cost models ignore, can lead to asymmetric  price rigidity.  But the asymmetries  appear 
small. See Timur  Kuran,  "Asymmetric  Price  Rigidity  and Inflationary  Bias," American 
Economic  Reviewv, vol. 73 (June 1983),  pp. 373-82; Kuran, "Price Adjustment  Costs, Laiurence  Ball, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and David Roiner  13 
THE  NEW  ASSUMPTIONS  IN  NEW  KEYNESIAN  MODELS 
Aside from the specific arguments  outlined above, recent research 
establishes the general point that nominal rigidities can result from 
optimizing  choices of agents in well-specified models. This contrasts 
with  the ad hoc imposition  of rigidities  in many  of the Keynesian  models 
of the 1970s. Recent progress is largely a result of two innovations in 
modeling:  the introduction  of imperfect  competition  and  greater  empha- 
sis on price  rather  than  wage rigidities. 
Imperfect  Competition. Microeconomists  have long recognized  that 
sticky  prices  and  perfect  competition  are  incompatible.  14  In  a competitive 
market,  a firm  does not set its price, but accepts the price quoted  by the 
Walrasian  auctioneer. Only under imperfect competition, when firms 
set prices, does it make sense to ask whether  a firm  adjusts  its price to a 
shock. Nonetheless,  Keynesian models of  the  1970s, most clearly 
disequilibrium  models, imposed  nominal  rigidities  on otherwise  Walras- 
ian  economies. The result  was embarrassments  in the form  of unappeal- 
ing  results  or the need  for additional  arbitrary  assumptions.  Many  recent 
models simply  generalize  earlier  models by allowing  the firms'  demand 
curves to slope down. This single modification  sweeps away many of 
the problems with older models. Specifically, the new models with 
imperfect  competition  offer six advantages: 
-Private  costs  of rigidity are second  order. Under perfect competi- 
tion, the gains from nominal adjustment  are large. For example, if 
nominal  demand  rises and  prices do not adjust,  there is excess demand. 
In this situation,  an individual  firm  can raise its price significantly  and 
still sell as much output as before, which implies a large increase in 
profits.  In contrast, under  imperfect  competition  a higher  price always 
implies  lower sales. Starting  from the profit-maximizing  price-qllantity 
combination,  the gains from  trading  off price and sales after  a shc-k are 
second order. 
Anticipated  Inflation,  and  Output,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 101  (May  1986), 
pp. 407-18. 
14. See, for example,  Kenneth  J. Arrow,  "Toward  a Theory  of Price  Adjustment,"  in 
Moses Abramovitz  and others, eds., The Allocation  of Economic  Resources:  Essays  in 
Honor of Bernard Francis Haley (Stanford  University  Press, 1959), pp. 41-5  1. 14  Br-ookings  Paper-s  on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
-Output  is demand determined. When  price rigidity  is imposed  on a 
Walrasian  market, so that the market does not clear, it is natural  to 
assume that quantity  equals the smaller  of supply and demand, so that 
output falls below the Walrasian  level when price is either above or 
below the Walrasian  level. But Keynesians  believe that  when prices are 
rigid, increases in demand,  which mean  prices below Walrasian  levels, 
raise output,  just as decreases in demand  reduce output. This result is 
built into many Keynesian models through  the unappealing  assumption 
that output  is demand  determined  even if demand  exceeds supply. For 
example, in the Gray-Fischer  contract  model, firms  hire as much  labor 
as they want, regardless  of the preferences of workers.15  In contrast, 
under imperfect competition, demand determination  arises naturally. 
Firms  set prices  and  then  meet demand.  Crucially,  if demand  rises, firms 
are happy to sell more even if they do not adjust  their prices, because 
under  imperfect  competition  price initially  exceeds marginal  cost. Thus 
changes  in  demand  always  cause changes  in  output  in the same  direction. 
-Booms  raise welfare. Under perfect competition, the equilibrium 
level of output in the absence of shocks is efficient. Thus increases in 
output resulting  from positive shocks, as well as decreases resulting 
from negative shocks, reduce welfare. In the Gray-Fischer  model, for 
example, half the welfare loss from the business cycle occurs when 
workers  are  required  to work  more  than  they want. In actual  economies, 
unusually  high  output  and employment  mean  that  the economy is doing 
well.16 And this is the case in models of imperfect  competition. Since 
imperfect competition  pushes the no-shock level of output below the 
social optimum,  welfare  rises when output  rises above this level. 
-Wage  rigidity causes  unemployment  through low aggregate  de- 
mand.  In 1970s  models  with  sticky  nominal  wages, unemployment  occurs 
when prices  fall short  of the level expected when wages were set, so that 
real wages rise and firms  move up their  labor  demand  curves. In actual 
economies, however, firms  often appear  to reduce  employment  because 
demand  for their output is low, not because real wages are high. This 
fact is not necessarily a problem  for Keynesian theories if the goods 
market  is imperfectly  competitive. In this case, a firm's  labor demand 
15. Fischer, "Long-Term  Contracts,"  and  Gray,  "On  Indexation." 
16. Of course economists worry that low unemployment  may be inflationary.  But 
sticky-price  models  with  perfect  competition  imply  that  low unemployment  is undesirable 
per  se. Laiur-ence  Ball, N. Gregoty Mankiw,  and David Romer  15 
depends on real aggregate  demand as well as the real wage, because 
changes in aggregate demand shift the firm's product demand (see 
equation  2). 
-Real  wages need not be countercyclical.  Imperfect  competition  can 
remedy  an  embarrassing  empirical  failure  of traditional  models  based on 
sticky nominal wages-the  cyclical behavior of real wages. We can 
tautologically  write  P =  pWIMPL,  where P is the price level, W  is the 
wage, MPL  is the marginal  product  of labor,  and p is the markup  of price 
over marginal  cost. If the markup  is constant and marginal  prodtuct  of 
labor  is diminishing,  as many 1970s  models  assumed,  then  the real  wage, 
WIP  = MPLI,u,  must  be countercyclical.  In actual  economies, however, 
real  wages  appear  acyclical  or  abit procyclical.  This  fact can  be explained 
if the marginal  product  of labor is constant, as suggested  by Hall, or if 
the markup  is countercyclical.  as suggested  by Rotemberg  and Saloner 
and by  Bils. 7  Thus there need not be a link between changes in 
employment  and changes  in real wages. 
-Nominal  rigidities  have  aggregate  demand  externalities.  As  we 
have explained, since real aggregate  demand  affects the demand  curves 
facing  individual  firms,  nominal  rigidities  have externalities.  Rigidity  in 
one firm's  price contributes  to rigidity  in the price level, which causes 
fluctuations  in real aggregate  demand  and thus harms  all firms. These 
externalities  are crucial  to the finding  that small  frictions  can have large 
macroeconomic  effects. The externalities  depend on imperfect  compe- 
tition, for under  perfect competition,  aggregate  demand  is irrelevant  to 
individual  firms  because they can sell all they want at the going  price. 
ProduictMarketRigidities.  Keynes and most Keynesians  emphasize 
rigidities  in nominal  wages. But recent  work  focuses largely  on rigidities 
in product  prices. The change  offers two advantages. 
-Goods  are sold  in spot  markets.  Although  there is clearly  much 
nominal  wage rigidity  in actual  economies-in  U.S. labor  contracts,  for 
example, wages are set up to three years in advance-the  allocative 
effects of this  rigidity  are  unclear.  The  implicit  contracts  literature  shows 
that it may be  efficient for contract signers to  make employment 
17. Robert  E. Hall, "Market  Structure  and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  BPEA, 
2: 1986, pp. 285-322;  Julio J. Rotemberg  and Garth  Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic 
Model of Price Wars  during  Booms," American Econiomic Review, vol. 76 (June 1986), 
pp. 390-407; Mark Bils, "Cyclical Pricing  of Durable Luxuries," Working  Paper 83 
(University  of Rochester  Center  for Economic  Research,  May 1987). 16  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
independent  of wages. That is, given long-term  relationships  with their 
workers, firms  may choose the efficient amount  of employment  rather 
than  moving  along  their  labor  demand  curves when real  wages change.  18 
In many  product  markets,  on the other hand, buyers clearly operate  on 
their  demand  curves. For  example,  the  local  shoe store  has  no agreement, 
explicit or implict, from its customers to buy the efficient number  of 
shoes regardless of the prices. Instead, rigidity in the store's prices 
affects its sales of shoes. 
-Real  wages need not be countercyclical. As we  argue above, 
acyclical  real wages are  possible even if nominal  rigidities  occur only in 
wages. But it is easiest to explain  acyclical or procyclical  real wages if 
prices as well as wages are sticky. In this case, the effect of a shock on 
real  wages depends  on the relative  sizes of the adjustments  of prices and 
wages. 
Despite the advantages  of studying  rigidities  in goods markets,  we are 
ambivalent  about  the deemphasis  of labor  markets,  because  the apparent 
rigidities in nominal wages may have important allocative effects. 
Further  research  on the relative  importance  of wage and  price rigidities 
is needed. 
DISCUSSION 
We conclude  this section by discussing  several issues concerning  the 
importance  of recent theories  and  their  plausibility. 
The  Importance  of Nominal  Rigidities. Nominal  rigidities  are essen- 
tial for explaining  important  features of business cycles. As we have 
emphasized,  real  effects of nominal  disturbances,  such as changes  in the 
money  stock, depend  on some  nominal  imperfection.  The  only  prominent 
alternative to nominal rigidities is  imperfect information  about the 
aggregate  price level, an explanation  that  many  economists  find  implau- 
sible. It is possible, of course, to maintain  that money is neutral  in the 
short run-that  Paul Volcker, for example, had nothing  to do with the 
1982  recession-but  this also appears  unrealistic  to many economists. 
18. Early  expositions  ofthis  ideaappearin  Martin  Neil Baily,  "Wages  and  Employment 
under  Uncertain  Demand,"  Review  of Economic  Studies, vol. 41 (January  1974),  pp. 37- 
50;  Costas  Azariadis,  "Implicit  Contracts  and Underemployment  Equilibria,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy,  vol. 83 (December  1975),  pp. 1183-1202;  and Robert  E. Hall, "The 
Rigidity  of Wages  and  the Persistence  of Unemployment,"  BPEA,  2:1975,  pp. 301-35. Lautrence  Ball, N. Gregoty Mankiw,  and David Rower  17 
Thus it is difficult  to explain  the relation  of output  to nominal  variables 
without  nominal  rigidities. 
Nominal  rigidities  are also important  for explaining  the effects of real 
shocks to aggregate  demand, resulting,  for example, from changes in 
government  spending  or in the expectations of investors. The point is 
clear if we interpret  M in the aggregate  demand  equation, Y = MIP, as 
simply a shift term, in which case real disturbances  that shift demand 
affect output  through  the same channels  as changes  in money. 
Not all explanations  for the output effects of real demand shocks 
depend  on nominal  imperfections.  Robert  Barro's  model  of government 
purchases,  for  one, does not. 19  But  such  explanations  invoke  implausibly 
large  labor  supply  elasticities.  Thus  nominal  rigidities,  while  not the only 
explanation  for the effects of real demand,  are perhaps  the most appeal- 
ing. 
In the models we have surveyed, slow adjustment  of prices implies 
that  shocks cause temporary  deviations  of output  and  employment  from 
their  "natural  rates.  " Recently,  however, models  of hysteresis, in which 
shocks have permanent  effects, have become popular. For example, 
Blanchard  and Summers  argue  that  the natural  rate  of unemployment  in 
European  countries changes when actual unemployment  changes, so 
that there is no unique  level to which unemployment  returns.20  If these 
theories are correct, then nominal  rigidities  cannot  fully explain  unem- 
ployment, because nominal prices eventually adjust to shocks; some 
additional  explanation,  such as the insider-outsider  model in Blanchard 
and Summers, is needed for the persistence of unemployment. But 
nominal  rigidities  may be crucial for explaining  the initial impulses in 
unemployment.  For example, after rising during  the late 1970s,  unem- 
ployment  in Britain  has remained  high, suggesting  hysteresis. But the 
best explanation  for the original  increase  is arguably  a conventional  one: 
slow adjustment  of wages and  prices  to shocks like tight  monetary  policy 
and  increases  in import  prices. 
The Importance  of Externalities from  Rigidity.  Externalities  from 
nominai  rigidity,  the central  element of menu  cost models, are essential 
19. Robert  J. Barro,  "Output  Effects  of Government  Purchases,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 89 (December  1981),  pp. 1086-1121. 
20. Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence Summers, "Hysteresis and the European 
Unemployment  Problem,"  in Stanley  Fischer,  ed., NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual,  1986 
(MIT  Press, 1986),  pp. 15-78. 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
for a plausible  theory  of rigidities.  If rigidities  exist, one of the following 
statements must be true: rigidities do not impose large costs on the 
economy;  rigidities  have large  costs to the firms  and  workers  who create 
them, but these are exceeded by the costs of reducing rigidities; or 
rigidities  have small  private  costs, and so small  frictions  are sufficient  to 
create them, but externalities  from rigidity impose large costs on the 
economy. The problem with the first statement is the difficulty of 
explaining apparently  costly events, such as rises in unemployment 
following  monetary  contractions,  without  nominal  rigidities.  The second 
seems implausible:  it would not be costly for magazine  publishers to 
print  new prices  every year  rather  than  every  four  years, as they typically 
do.2"  Thus the third  statement  is the best hope for explaining  rigidities. 
What  Are Menu Costs? Models of nominal  rigidity  depend on some 
cost of full flexibility, albeit a small one. The term menu cost may be 
misleading  because the physical costs of printing  menus and catalogs 
may not be the most important  barriers  to flexibility. Perhaps more 
important  is the lost convenience of fixing  prices in nominal  terms-the 
cost of learning  to think  in real  terms  and  of computing  the nominal  price 
changes corresponding  to desired real price changes. More generally, 
we can view infrequent  revision  of nominal  prices  as a rule  of thumb  that 
is more  convenient  than  continuous  revision.  Thus, rather  than  referring 
to menus, we can state the central  argument  of recent  papers  as follows. 
Firms  take  the convenient  shortcut  of infrequently  reviewing  and  chang- 
ing prices. The resulting  profit  loss is small, so firms  have little  incentive 
to eliminate the shortcut, but externalities make the macroeconomic 
effects large. 
At a somewhat deeper level, we can interpret  the convenience of 
fixing nominal rather  than real prices as that of using the medium of 
exchange,  dollars,  as a unit  of account.22  Alternatively,  following  Akerlof 
and Yellen, we can view simple rules of thumb  as arising  from "near- 
21. Stephen G. Cecchetti, "The Frequency of Price Adjustment:  A Study of the 
Newsstand Prices of Magazines,"  Journal  of Econometrics,  vol. 31 (August 1986),  pp. 
255-74. The cost of reducing  nominal  wage  rigidity  may  be significant  if rigidity  is reduced 
through  shorter  labor  contracts,  which  require  more  frequent  negotiations  between  unions 
and management.  But wage rigidity  can also be reduced  through  greater  indexation  or by 
having  the nominal  wage change  more  often over the life of a contract,  neither  of which 
appears  to have large  costs. 
22. Bennett T. McCallum,  "On 'Real' and 'Sticky-Price'  Theories of the Business 
Cycle,"  Journal of Money,  Credit, and Banking, vol.  18 (November  1986), pp. 397-414. Lalurence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer  19 
rationality,"  a small  departure  from  full optimization.23  In any case, the 
precise  source  of frictions  is not  important.  The  effects of nominal  shocks 
are  the same  whether  rigidity  arises  from  printing  costs, near-rationality, 
or something  else. 
Inflation, the Frequency of Adjustment, and the Phillips Curve 
Recent research  shows that  nominal  rigidity  is possible in principle- 
that one can construct  a model with firm  microeconomic  foundations  in 
which rational agents choose substantial  rigidity. But the validity of 
Keynesian theories is not thereby  established. For these theories to be 
convincing,  they must  have empirical  implications  that  contradict  other 
macroeconomic  theories, and these predictions  must be confirmed  by 
evidence. This section  derives  implications  of recent  Keynesian  models, 
and the next section tests them. As explained in the introduction,  the 
main prediction  is that the real effects of nominal shocks are smaller 
when average inflation  is higher. Higher average inflation  erodes the 
frictions that cause nonneutralities,  for example by causing more fre- 
quent  wage and  price  adjustments. 
This section studies a specific model of the class described in the 
previous section. In the model, a cost of price adjustment  leads firms  to 
change prices at intervals rather than continuously. In addition to 
providing  a basis for the empirical  tests of the next major  section, the 
model is of theoretical  interest. Previous  models of nominal  rigidity  are 
highly stylized; for example, most menu cost models are static. Our 
model is dynamic and has the appealing  feature that the price level 
adjusts slowly over time to a nominal  shock. The speed of adjustment, 
which  is treated  as exogenous  in older  Keynesian  models,  is endogenous. 
It depends on the frequency of price adjustment  by individual  firms, 
which in turn  is derived  from  profit-maximization.24 
We first present the model and show that high average inflation 
reduces the output  effects of nominal  shocks. We also show that highly 
variable  aggregate  demand  reduces these effects. We then investigate 
23. Akerlof  and  Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model." 
24. The speed  of adjustment  is also endogenous  in Laurence  Ball, "Externalities  from 
Contract Length," Amesrican  Economic Review, vol. 77 (September  1987), pp. 615-29. 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
the model's quantitative  implications  by calculating  the real effects of 
shocks for a range of plausible parameter  values. The results suggest 
that the effects of average inflation  and demand variability  are large. 
Next we argue  that the implications  of our model are robust:  they carry 
over to broad  classes of other Keynesian  models. 
Finally,  we compare  the predictions  of Keynesian  theories  with  those 
of models in the new classical or equilibrium  tradition, focusing on 
Lucas's model of imperfect information. Like our model, Lucas's 
predicts  that  the size of the real  effects of shocks depends  negatively  on 
the variance of aggregate  demand. Since this prediction  is common to 
Keynesian and new classical theories, testing it empirically,  as Lucas 
and others have done, is not useful for distinguishing  between the two 
theories. Crucially,  Lucas's model differs  from ours by predicting  that 
the effects of shocks do not depend  on average  inflation.  This difference 
leads to the tests of the models in the next section. 
THE  MODEL  AND  QUALITATIVE  RESULTS 
Our model of price adjustment  is similar  in spirit to those of John 
Taylor and Olivier Blanchard.25  The model is set in continuous time. 
The economy contains  imperfectly  competitive  firms  that  change  prices 
at discrete intervals  rather  than continuously,  because adjustments  are 
costly. Price setting is staggered, with an equal proportion  of firms 
changing  prices at every instant.  The crucial  departure  from  Taylor  and 
Blanchard  is that the length of time between price changes, and hence 
the rate at which the price level adjusts  to shocks, is endogenous.  Thus 
we can study  the determinants  of the speed of adjustment. 
Consider  the behavior of a representative  firm, firm  i. Rather than 
derive a profit  function from specific cost and demand  functions, we 
simply  assume that firm  i's profits  depend  on three variables:  aggregate 
spending  in the economy, y; firm  i's relative price, pi -  p; and a firm- 
specific shock, Oi  (all variables  are in logs). The aggregate  price level p 
is  defined simply as the average of prices across firms. Aggregate 
spending  y affects firm  i's profits  by shifting  the demand  curve that it 
faces. When aggregate  spending rises, the firm sells more at a given 
25.  Taylor,  "Staggered  Wage  Setting"  and  "Aggregate  Dynamics  and  Staggered 
Contracts"; and Blanchard, "Price Asynchronization"  and "Wage Price Spiral." Lauirence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer  21 
relative  price. The term  pi -  p affects the firm's  profits  by determining 
the position on the demand curve at which it operates. And Oi  is an 
idiosyncratic  shock to either demand  or costs (the presence of Oi  is not 
needed for our main qualitative results, but it  strongly affects the 
quantitative  results  of the next section). 
We assume that the elasticity of firm  i's profit-maximizing  real price, 
Pi  -  p,  with respect to y is a positive constant, v. Without loss of 
generality,  we assume that the elasticity of pi  -  p with respect to Oi  is 
one, and  that  Oi  has zero mean. Thus we can write  the profit-maximizing 
real  price  as 
(5)  Pi  (t)  -  p(t)  =  v[y(t)  -  y(t)]  +  Oi(t),  v >  0, 
where  y is the natural  rate of output-the  level at which, if Oi  equals its 
mean, the firm  desires a relative  price of one. (Relative  prices equal to 
one is the condition  for a symmetric  equilibrium  of the economy when 
prices are flexible.)26 
If price adjustment  were costless, firm  i would set pi =  pi  at every 
instant. We assume, however, that an adjustment  cost leads firms to 
change prices only at intervals of length X, which for simplicity is 
constant over time (later  in this section we discuss the implications  of 
allowing  X  to vary). Specifically,  each price change has a fixed cost F, 
so adjustment  costs per period  are  FIX. 
As noted above, an equal proportion  of firms sets prices at every 
instant.27  If firm  i sets a price  at t, it chooses the price and  A to maximize 
its expected profits,  averaged  over the life of the price (from  t to t + X). 
Maximizing  profits is equivalent to minimizing  profit  losses from two 
sources: adjustment costs  and deviations of  price from the profit- 
26.  As an example of foundations for equation 5, suppose that firm  i's demand equation 
is Yi  =  y  -  E(Pi  -  p) (demand depends on aggregate spending and the firm's relative price), 
and that its log costs  are yyi +  (1  -  e  +  Ey)Oi. This implies equation 5 with v =  (y -  1)/ 
(1 -  e + Ey) and -  =  [1/(y -  1)] ln [(e  -  1)/Ey] (the coefficient  on Oi  in the cost function is 
chosen  to satisfy  the normalization  that the coefficient  on Oi  in equation 5 is one).  For 
deeper microfoundations,  see Ball and Romer, "Equilibrium and Optimal Timing of Price 
Changes,"  where a price-setting rule like equation 5 is derived from utility and production 
functions. 
27.  We assume  that price setting is staggered so that inflation is smooth.  If all firms 
changed prices at the same times, the aggregate price level would remain constant between 
adjustments and thenjump discretely.  We do not model the sources of staggering explicitly; 
for explanations of staggering, see the references in note 11. 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
maximizing  level. We approximate  the latter  by 1  K (pi -  p*)2,  where 
K is  the negative of  the  second derivative of profits with respect 
to pi  -  pi. Thus firm  i's loss per unit of time is 
(6)  F + !!K  Et [pi (t + s)  PJ2  ds  x +  = 
Minimization  of equation  6 implies  a simple  rule  for choosing  pi: 
(7)  Pi = ,  Et  p  (t + s)ds. 
That is,  a firm sets its price to the average of its expected profit- 
maximizing  prices  for the period  when the price  is in effect. We describe 
the more complicated  determination  of X  below. 
To study  the effects of nominal  shocks, we must  introduce  a stochastic 
nominal  variable.  We assume that  the log of nominal  aggregate  demand, 
x =y  + p, is exogenous and follows the continuous-time  analogue  of a 
random  walk  with drift: 
(8)  x(t)  =  gt  +  o>XW(t), 
where W(t)  is a Wiener  process. The first  term  in the expression  for x(t) 
captures  trend  growth of g per unit time; the second captures  random 
walk innovations with variance (o2 per unit time. Our analysis below 
focuses on the effects of the parameters  g and a-x  on the economy. A 
monetarist  interpretation  of equation 8 is that x(t) =  m(t) +  V-the 
velocity of money  is constant,  and  aggregate  demand  is driven  by random 
walk movements in the money stock. A more general  interpretation  is 
that  a variety  of exogenous variables-fiscal policy, the expectations  of 
investors, and so on-drive  x(t). 
We make two final assumptions. First, the natural  rate of output 
grows smoothly  at rate p,: 
(9)  y-(t)=  =,  t. 
Along with the process for x(t), this implies that average inflation  is 
g -  p,.  Second, the firm-specific  disturbances,  the Oi's,  are uncorrelated 
across firms  and follow continuous-time  random  walks whose innova- 
tions have mean zero and  variance  ao per unit  time.28 
28. More precisely, we assume that Oi  follows a stationary  process and consider  the 
limit as this process approaches  a random  walk. (If Oi  is a random  walk, its mean is 
undefined,  which  contradicts  our  earlier  assumption  that  its mean  is zero.) Laurence  Ball, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and David Romner  23 
The Behavior  of  the  Economy  for  a  Given  Frequency  of  Price 
Changes. Below we show that average inflation, by influencing  the 
interval  between price changes, affects the output-inflation  trade-off  in 
our  model. A preliminary  step is to solve for  the behavior  of the economy 
for a given interval,  X.  We do this by combining  our assumptions  about 
price setting  by individual  firms  and then aggregating.  The behavior  of 
individual  firms  determines  the behavior  of the price  level. As described 
above, the behavior  of price level-which  each firm,  being small, takes 
as given-in  turn determines  the behavior of firms. The condition for 
equilibrium  is that  individual  and  aggregate  behavior  are consistent;  that 
is, that profit-maximizing  price-setting  rules for individual  firms  given 
the behavior of the price level in fact yield that behavior of the price 
level. The details are complicated,  so we leave them for the appendix. 
Here we simply  present  our main  results. 
The solution  for the behavior  of the price level takes the form 
(10)  p(t)  =  (g  -  )t  +  f  w(s;X) dZ (t -s), 
where dZ (t -  s) -  >dW(t -  s) is the innovation  in aggregate  demand 
at t -  s. The first  term  in equation  10  captures  average  inflation  of g -  PI  , 
and  the second captures  the effects of shocks. The term  w(s;X) gives the 
effect of a demand  shock at t -  s on the price level at t. 
The appendix  derives  the expression  that  defines  w(.). We cannot  find 
an analytic  solution  to the expression  and  therefore  solve it numerically; 
the appendix describes how. We find when we  solve for w(.)  that, 
assuming v<1,  w(s;X) equals zero when s=O,  increases with s,  and 
approaches  one as s approaches  infinity.  That  is, the immediate  effect of 
a shock on the price  level is zero (because an infinitesimal  proportion  of 
firms  changes prices at t); the effect of the shock grows over time; and 
asymptotically  the shock is passed one-for-one  into prices. 
The crucial  result  about  w(.) concerns  the frequency  of price  changes: 
when v< 1, w(s;X) is decreasing  in X.  A longer  interval  between changes 
in individual  prices leads to slower adjustment  of the aggregate  price 
level-for  any s, a smaller  proportion  of a shock at t -  s is passed into 
prices by t.29 
29. If v >  1, firms  want  to adjust  their  prices  more  than  one-for-one  with real  output; 
as a result,  in this  case the approach  to full  adjustment  is oscillatory.  The  response  is again 
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The behavior  of real output  follows directly  from the behavior  of the 
price  level, the stochastic  process for  aggregate  demand,  and  the identity 
y  =  x  -p: 
(  1  1  )  y((t)  -  =  f  [1 -  w(s;X)] dZ (t -  s). 
=  =o 
The sizes of the real  effects of nominal  shocks are  given by 1 -  w(.); this 
is the theoretical  counterpart  of the parameter  that we estimate in the 
following  section. 
Finally, equation  11  implies  an expression  for the variance  of output: 
(12)  E{[y(t) -y  ]  f  [1 -  w(s;X)]2ds. 
s=0 
The variance  of output  depends on the variance  of demand  shocks, 02, 
and the size of the effects of shocks, 1 -  w(.). This result  is also used in 
the empirical  work  of the next major  section. 
The Equilibrium Frequency  of  Price  Changes.  We  now  derive  a 
condition defining the equilibrium  interval between price changes. 
Consider  firm  i's problem  of choosing  its interval,  Xi,  given that  all other 
firms in the economy choose an interval X. The value of a firm's loss 
function, L (equation  6), is affected by both Xi  and X;  the latter  matters 
because it determines  the behavior  of the price level. Minimization  of 
L(Xi,  X)  with  respect  to Xi  yields the first-order  condition  aL(Xi,  X)/axi = 0. 
A symmetric  Nash equilibrium  for X,  XE  is defined  implicitly  by setting 
Xi  = X  in this condition: 
(13)  )  |  0. 
In other words, an interval X is an equilibrium  if, when X is chosen 
throughout  the economy, it is in firm  i's interest  to choose X  as well.30 
Because we can find w(.) only numerically,  we must also find the 
30.  Solving  for the equilibrium interval between  price changes  is different from the 
common exercise of solving for the socially optimal interval. See, for example, Gray, "On 
Indexation"  (which focuses  on the interval between  wage changes-that  is, the length of 
labor contracts).  The equilibrium and optimal intervals differ because,  as we stress in the 
first section,  firms' choices  of the frequency  of price adjustment have externalities.  See 
Ball, "Externalities from Contract Length,"  for a further discussion  of this point. Laurence  Ball, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and David Romner  25 
equilibrium  X  numerically,  as described  in the appendix.  We find  that X 
is decreasing  in i,  o-x,  and ao.,  where iT- g -  p, is the average inflation 
rate. Thus the interval between price changes decreases the higher 
average  inflation.  High inflation  causes a firm's  profit-maximizing  nom- 
inal price to change rapidly, which raises the benefits from frequent 
adjustment.  The interval  X also decreases the greater  the variances of 
aggregate  and firm-specific  shocks. When either variance is large, a 
firm's  future  profit-maximizing  price  is highly  uncertain,  so the firm  does 
not wish to fix its price  for long. 
These results, along  with the results  about  the effects of X,  imply  that 
the Phillips  curve is steeper when iT,  o-a,  or ar is larger.  Higher  average 
inflation  reduces  the interval  between  price  changes,  which  in turn  raises 
w(.), the  proportion  of a shock  that  is passed  into  prices.  A larger  variance 
of aggregate  or firm-specific  shocks also reduces X  and thus raises w(.). 
These  results  imply that increases  in  iT,  a-,, or ar lead to decreases  in 
1  -  w(.),  the real effects of shocks. These predictions lead to the 
empirical  tests of the next section. 
QUANTITATIVE  RESULTS 
We now ask whether  the effects of inflation  and demand  variability 
identified  above are quantitatively  important.  We do so by computing 
the interval  between price changes and the real effects of shocks for a 
range  of plausible  parameter  values. 
Choice of Parameters. Since our focus is the effects of average 
inflation,  g -  [t, and  the standard  deviation  of demand,  a..,  we experiment 
with  wide ranges  of values  of these parameters  (g and p affect the results 
only through  their difference). This leaves three other parameters  for 
which we need baseline values: F/K,  the ratio of the cost of changing 
prices to the negative of the second derivative  of the profit  function  (F 
and  K enter  only through  their  ratio);  ur, the standard  deviation  of firm- 
specific shocks; and v, the elasticity of a firm's  profit-maximizing  real 
price with  respect to aggregate  output. 
We choose baseline parameters  by experimenting  with values of 
F/K,  uo, and v to find  a combination  that implies plausible  sizes for the 
real effects of shocks. We then ask whether  these parameter  values are 
realistic.  Finally, we investigate  robustness  by calculating  the effects of 
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It is difficult  to measure F  and K directly, so we take an indirect 
approach.  In a model of steady inflation  and no shocks (ur = ur =  0), 
F/K determines  the frequency of price changes. With  F/K  =  0.00015, 
firms  change  prices every five quarters  under  steady 3 percent inflation 
and  every two quarters  under  steady  12  percent  inflation.  Microeconomic 
evidence suggests that actual  intervals  between price changes typically 
average  two years or more. Thus our baseline value of F/K is conserva- 
tive. We certainly do not assume menu costs that are too large to be 
consistent with price setting  in actual  economies.31 
To pick a value for uo, we use the fact that uzr  equals the standard 
deviation of movements in profit-maximizing  prices, the p*'s, across 
firms. This leads us to use data on relative price variability  to gauge 
plausible values of ur. Vining and Elwertowski report a 4-5 percent 
standard  deviation of annual relative price movements across highly 
disaggregate  (8-digit)  components  of the U.S. consumer  price  index;  this 
is consistent with our assumption  of uO =  3 percent.32 
Finally, there is little quantitative  evidence concerning  the size of v, 
the elasticity of profit-maximizing  relative  prices with respect to aggre- 
gate output.  However, our choice of a small  elasticity, 0. 1, is consistent 
with the common view that relative prices vary little in response to 
aggregate  fluctuations. Our baseline parameters  are therefore  F/K 
0.00015,  uo = 3 percent, and v = 0.1. 
Results.  Table  1 shows  the effects  of average inflation, g  -  VL,  and 
the variability of demand, u,  when F/K,  u.,  and v equal their baseline 
values.  For wide ranges of g  -  pL  and u,  the table shows  two figures. 
31. For microeconomic  evidence on price behavior,  see Cecchetti, "The Frequency 
of Price Adjustment";  Anil K. Kashyap, "Sticky Prices: New Evidence from Retail 
Catalogs"  (MIT,  November  1987);  and  W. A. H. Godley  and  C. Gillion,  "Pricing  Behavior 
in Manufacturing Industry,"  National  Institute Economic  Review,  no. 33 (August  1965), 
pp. 43-47. 
32. Daniel  R. Vining,  Jr., and Thomas  C. Elwertowski,  "The Relationship  between 
Relative Prices and the General Price Level," American Economic Review, vol. 66 
(September  1976),  pp. 699-708. As a measure  of r0, Vining  and Elwertowski's  figure  has 
both an upward  and a downward  bias. The upward  bias occurs because staggered  price 
adjustment  causes  actual  prices,  the  pi's, to vary  across  firms  even when  profit-maximizing 
prices, the p!'s,  do not. As a result, the standard  deviation of pi, which Vining and 
Elwertowski  measure,  is greater  than  the standard  deviation  of pi*,  which  equals r0.  The 
negative bias in that variation  across components  of the CPI, even if these are highly 
disaggregated,  is less than  variation  across  individual  prices.  It is difficult  to tell the  relative 
magnitudes  of these biases. Lauzlrence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw,  and David Romner  27 
Table 1.  Effect of a Nominal Shock on Real Output and the Equilibrium Interval 
between Price Changes  a 
Average 
inflation 
rate,  Demand  variability,  Co (percent) 
g-[  x 
(percent)  0  1  3  5  10  20 
0  0.560  0.540  0.495  0.424  0.250  0.078 
(31)  (30)  (28)  (25)  (17)  (10) 
2  0.519  0.519  0.470  0.405  0.250  0.078 
(29)  (29)  (27)  (24)  (17)  (10) 
5  0.424  0.424  0.405  0.366  0.224  0.078 
(25)  (25)  (24)  (22)  (16)  (10) 
10  0.322  0.322  0.299  0.299  0.199  0.078 
(20)  (20)  (19)  (19)  (15)  (10) 
20  0.174  0.174  0.174  0.174  0.124  0.057 
(14)  (14)  (14)  (14)  (12)  (9) 
50  0.057  0.057  0.057  0.057  0.039  0.023 
(9)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (8)  (7) 
100  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012 
(6)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (6) 
250  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
(4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  The table shows  the effects  of changing values of g  -  p. and u.  when FIK, uo, and v equal their baseline values. 
F/K is the ratio of the cost  of changing prices to minus the second  derivative of the profit function; uro  is the standard 
devialion  of  firm-specific  shocks;  and  v is  the  elasticity  of  a  firms  profit-maximizing  real  price  with  respect  to 
aggregate output.  Baseline  values:  F/K  =  0.00015;  u0  =  3 percent;  and v  =  0.1.  For each  entry  in the table,  the 
first number is the  percentage  effect  of a  I percent  nominal  shock  on  real output after six  months;  the number in 
parentheses  is the equilibrium interval between  pnrce changes,  X, in weeks. 
The first  is the percentage  effect of a 1  percent  change  in demand  on real 
output  six months  later. A value of zero would mean that prices adjust 
fully to the shock; a value of one would mean that prices do not adjust 
at all. We refer to this figure  as simply the real effect of a shock. The 
figure  in parentheses  is the equilibrium  interval  between price changes, 
X, in weeks. As we explain above, inflation and demand variability 
influence  the real  effects of shocks through  their  effects on X. 
Table 1 shows that realistic increases in average inflation have 
quantitatively  important  effects.  With  rO  =  3 percent, roughly the 
standard  deviation of nominal GNP growth for the postwar United 
States, the interval between price changes is 28 weeks if g  -  1.  = 0, but 
falls to  19 weeks  if g  -  1.  =  10 percent  and 6 weeks  if g  -  1.  =-  100 
percent.  As a result,  the real effect  of a shock  is 0.50 for g  -  1.  =  0, 
0.30 for g  -  1.  =  10 percent, and 0.01 for g  -  1.  =  100 percent. 28  Brookings  Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 2.  The Effects of Changes in FIK, v, and c0 on the Slope of the Phillips Curve 
and the Equilibrium Interval between Price Changes 
Aver-age  ijiflation 
rate,  a 
Parameter  val/tes  g  - 
CFO  5  20 
F/K  v  (percent)  percent  percent 
0.00015  0.1  3  0.405  0.174 
(24)  (14) 
0.0003  0.1  3  0.519  0.274 
(29)  (18) 
0.00015  0.2  3  0.273  0.080 
(24)  (14) 
0.00015  0.1  6  0.174  0.100 
(14)  (11) 
0.00045  0.1  6  0.405  0.274 
(24)  (18) 
0.0003  0.285  3  0.406  0.104 
(32)  (18) 
0.00015  0.0295  6  0.403  0.367 
(15)  (12) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  For various combinations  of F/K,  v', and (ro, the table shows  the real effect  of a nominal shock  and the interval 
between  price changes:  for each entry in the last two  columns  of the table,  the first number is the percentage  effect 
of a i  percent  nominal sliock  on real output after six  months: the number in parentheses  is the equilibrium interval 
between  price changes,  X, in weeks.  Demand variability, arx,  is set to 3 percent. 
Table 1 shows that increases in (r,  also have inmportant  effects. With 
average inflation  of 5 percent, raising  ou,  from 3 percent to 10 percent 
reduces the interval  between price changes  from 24 to 16  weeks and the 
real effect of a shock from 0.41 to 0.22. These effects are similar  to the 
effects of raising  average  inflation  from  5 percent  to 15  percent. 
Table  2 shows  the effects  of  varying F/K,  u.,  and v.  For  various 
combinations  of these parameters,  we show the real effect of a shock 
and the  interval between  price  changes  for g  -  11 =  5 percent  and 
g  -  11 =  20 percent,  assuming ou. =  3 percent in both cases.  The first 
line reproduces  the results for the baseline  parameters,  and each of the 
following  three lines shows the effects of doubling  one parameter  while 
holding  the others constant. An increase in FIK  raises the real effect of 
a shock, and  an increase  in uo  or v reduces  it. But  for all combinations  of 
F/K, u0,  and v, our central  result  holds:  higher  average  inflation  reduces 
the real  effect of a shock. The remaining  three  lines of the table show the 
effects of combinations  of changes that leave the real effect of a shock Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romner  29 
unchanged for g -  11  = 5 percent. These lines show how the parameters 
affect the strength  of the link between average inflation  and the real 
effect of a shock. 
ROBUSTNESS 
Traditional  Keynesian models, such as textbook models of price 
adjustment  or the staggered  contracts  models of Fischer and  Taylor,  do 
not share  the key predictions  of our model.33  These older theories treat 
the degree  of nominal  rigidity  (for  example, the length  of labor  contracts 
or the adjustment  speed of the price  level) as fixed  parameters;  thus they 
rule out the channel  through  which average  inflation  affects the output- 
inflation  trade-off. On the other hand, our central  results appear  to be 
robust  implications  of Keynesian  theories  in which  the degree  of rigidity 
is endogenous.  The intuition  for the effects of inflation  on the frequency 
of price  adjustment,  and  of this frequency  on the size of nonneutralities, 
is not tied to the specific  assumptions  of our model. 
One  assumption  of our  model  that  requires  attention  is that  the interval 
between  price  changes  is constant  over time. This assumption  is ad hoc: 
given our other  assumptions,  firms  could increase  profits  by varying  the 
interval  based on the realizations  of shocks. In addition,  the assumption 
is unrealistic,  because firms  in actual economies do not always change 
prices at fixed intervals. 
We now consider  the alternative  assumption  that  firms  can  freely vary 
the timing  of price changes. This assumption  of complete flexibility  is 
also far from  realistic. Most wages are adjusted  at constant  intervals  of 
a year. There appears to be greater flexibility in the timing of price 
changes, but the limited  evidence suggests that it is not complete. Mail 
order companies change prices at fixed times during the year, even 
though they issue catalogs much more frequently than they change 
prices, and thus could vary the dates of adjustments  without issuing 
extra catalogs. In addition,  a broad  range  of industries  appears  to have 
a preferred  time of the year, often January,  for price changes.34 
It is not yet possible to solve a model like ours with flexible timing, 
33. For a textbook model, see Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Stanley Fischer, Macroeco- 
nomics,  4th ed. (McGraw-Hill,  1987). 
34. For  evidence  on mail  order  catalogs,  see Kashyap,  "Sticky  Prices." For  evidence 
on industries'  preferred  months for price changes, see Julio J. Rotemberg  and Garth 
Saloner,  "A 'January  Effect' in the Pricing  of Goods" (MIT,  1988). 30  Br-ookings Paper s on Economfic Activity,  1  :1988 
but suggestive results are available  for simpler  models. In particular,  a 
literature  beginning  with Sheshinski  and Weiss presents  partial-equilib- 
rium  models in which  a firm  chooses to follow an "Ss" rule  for adjusting 
its price: whenever  inflation  pushes its real price outside some bounds, 
it adjusts  its nominal  price  to return  the real  price  to a target  level. These 
models reproduce a crucial implication  of our model: higher average 
inflation  leads to more frequent  price changes. High inflation  causes a 
firm's  real  price  to change  rapidly,  so, for given Ss bounds,  the price  hits 
the bounds more often. High inflation  also causes the firm  to widen its 
bounds, which reduces the frequency of price changes, but does not 
fully offset the first  effect.35 
For  our  main  argument  to hold,  the  more  frequent  changes  in  individual 
prices that result from higher inflation must lead in turn to faster 
adjustment  of the aggregate  price level. Intuition  clearly suggests a link 
between the frequency  of individual  adjustment  and the speed of aggre- 
gate adjustment,  but the difficulty  of studying  general  equilibrium  with 
flexible timing precludes a definitive  proof. Indeed, in one prominent 
special case, the link  does not exist. Andrew  Caplin  and  Daniel Spulber 
show that  if we assumne  that  firms  follow Ss rules with constant  bounds, 
and  if aggregate  demand  is nondecreasing,  then the aggregate  price  level 
adjusts immediately  to nominal shocks-nominal  shocks are neutral. 
Because aggregate adjustment  is always instantaneous, its speed is 
obviously independent  of the frequency  of individual  price  changes.36 
Current  research suggests that the Caplin-Spulber  result does not 
hold under  realistic  conditions. There exist examples in which firms  do 
not follow Ss  rules with constant bounds, and so a shock to the money 
supply  is not neutral,  either  if there is some persistence  to inflation  or if 
firms'  optimal  nominal  prices sometimes  fall. And when nonneutralities 
exist, it appears  plausible that their size depends on the frequency of 
individual  price adjustment.  Thus, overall, models of price adjustment 
with  flexible  timing  appear  consistent  with  the  predictions  of our  model.37 
35. The link between  inflation  and the frequency  of adjustment  is established  for the 
case of constant  inflation  in Eytan Sheshinski  and  Yoram  Weiss, "Inflation  and Costs of 
Price Adjustment,"  Review of Economic  Studies, vol. 44 (June 1977),  pp. 287-303. An 
extension to the case of stochastic  inflation  is presented  by Andrew  S. Caplin  and Eytan 
Sheshinski,  "Optimality  of (s, S) Pricing  Policies"  (Princeton  University,  1987). 
36. Andrew S. Caplin  and Daniel F. Spulber, "Menu Costs and the Neutrality  of 
Money,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol.  102 (November  1987), pp. 703-25. 
37. For  the implications  of persistent  inflation,  see Daniel  Tsiddon,  "On  the Stubborn- 
ness of Sticky Prices" (Columbia  University,  July 1987).  For the implications  of falling Lauirence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romner  31 
Another robustness issue concerns the nature of the friction that 
prevents nominal  flexibility.  In our model, the friction  is a fixed cost of 
price adjustment.  An alternative  view is that the technological  costs of 
making  prices highly flexible are negligible but that for some reason, 
such as convenience, the desire to avoid computation  costs, or habit, 
price setters nonetheless follow rules that focus on nominal prices.38 
Without  a theory that predicts the particular  rules of thumb  that price 
setters follow, theories of this type do not make precise predictions 
concerning  the relationship  between average  inflation  and the degree of 
price flexibility. But it appears that under reasonable interpretations 
these theories imply that higher  inflation  increases nominal  flexibility. 
As average  inflation  rises, so does the cost of following  a rule-of-thumb 
pricing  policy stated  in nominal  terms,  as does the evidence that  keeping 
a fixed nominal price is not equivalent to keeping a fixed real price. 
Although  price setters may continue  to follow rules of thumb,  they will 
increasingly think in terms of real rather than nominal magnitudes. 
Nominal  price  flexibility  will thus increase. 
THE  PREDICTIONS  OF  NEW  CLASSICAL  THEORIES 
The prediction  of Keynesian  models  that  average  inflation  affects the 
output-inflation  trade-off is important  because it is inconsistent with 
alternative  macroeconomic  models in the new classical tradition.  We 
now review  the predictions  of new classical  models,  focusing  on Lucas's 
imperfect  information  theory. Like Keynesian  models of nominal  rigid- 
ity, Lucas's model is designed  to explain  the effects of nominal  shocks 
on output-that is, to generate a short-run  Phillips  curve. But Lucas's 
model has different  implications  about what determines  the size of the 
effects. 
In Lucas's model, agents wish to change their output  in response to 
changes in their relative prices, but not in response to changes in the 
aggregate  price level. When an agent observes a change in his price, 
however, he cannot  tell whether  it results  from  a relative  or an aggregate 
optimal  prices, see Blanchard,  "Why Does Money Affect Output?"  and Tsiddon, "The 
(Mis)behavior  of the Aggregate  Price  Level" (Columbia  University,  1987).  These authors 
establish  results for the special case in which a firm's  optimal  price moves one-for-one 
with  aggregate  demand  and  is independent  of the price  level (v =  I in our  notation). 
38. See Akerlof  and  Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model." 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
movement.  He acts upon  his best guess, which is that  part  of the change 
comes from each source. Since agents interpret  any price change as 
partly relative, changes that in fact result from a nominal  shock have 
effects on output. 
In Lucas's model, the size of the effects of nominal  shocks depends 
on the relative magnitudes  of nominal  and idiosyncratic  real shocks. In 
particular,  if nominal shocks are large, agents attribute most of the 
movements  in their  prices to nominal  shocks, and respond  little. Thus a 
large variance of nominal aggregate  demand leads to a steep Phillips 
curve. Lucas  presents  cross-country  evidence supporting  this  prediction 
in his famous 1973  paper. We show, however, that Keynesian models 
make the same prediction, although the reason-a  large variance of 
aggregate  demand  causes  more  frequent  price  changes-is  very  different. 
Because both Keynesian and new classical theories explain Lucas's 
results, his test does not help to distinguish  between them. 
The effect of average  inflation  on the output-inflation  trade-off  does 
distinguish  Keynesian and new classical models. Theories of nominal 
rigidities  predict  that high inflation  makes the Phillips  curve steeper. In 
Lucas's imperfect  information  model, average  inflation  is irrelevant  to 
the output-inflation  trade-off, because only the variances of random 
variables, not the means, affect the uncertainty  that agents face. This 
difference  between the theories is the basis for our empirical  work. (A 
simple correlation  between average  inflation  and  the slope of the Phillips 
curve is consistent with Lucas's model, because average inflation  is 
correlated  with the variance of demand, which affects the slope. Tne 
issue is whether there is a relation  between average inflation  and the 
slope after  we control  for the variance  of demand.) 
Another difference between the predictions  of Keynesian and new 
classical  theories  concerns  the effects of idiosyncratic  shocks. According 
to Lucas, a large variance of relative price shocks increases the real 
effects of nominal shocks, because it raises the proportion  of these 
shocks that agents misperceive  as real. Our  model predicts  that a large 
variance of idiosyncratic shocks, like a large variance of aggregate 
shocks, leads  to more  frequent  price  changes  and  thus  reduces the effects 
of nominal  shocks. If one could construct  a measure  of the variance  of 
firm-specific  shocks, which we  do not attempt in this paper, then 
estimating  the relation  between this variable  and  the slope of the Phillips 
curve would  be another  test between the two competing  theories. 
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model is real business-cycle theory.39  This theory attributes  all fluctua- 
tions in output to real disturbances  and assumes that nominal distur- 
bances are simply  passed into prices. Because nominal  shocks have no 
causal role in output  fluctuations,  it is difficult  for the theory to explain 
the observed positive correlations  of real and nominal  variables, much 
less the effect of average  inflation  on the strength  of these correlations. 
King and Plosser have devised a real business-cycle model in which 
output  moves  with  nominal  money  through  r  everse causality:  the  banking 
system creates inside money in anticipation  of output  movements. But 
as Mankiw  points out, the model predicts  that the aggregate  price level 
falls when output  rises.40  Thus  real  business-cycle  models  do not appear 
to provide  an alternative  explanation  of the results  that  we report  below. 
International  Evidence 
We examine here how the trade-off between output and inflation 
varies across countries. Our goal is  to  test  the theoretical results 
discussed in the previous section. In particular,  we wish to examine 
whether  in countries with high rates of inflation,  changes in aggregate 
demand  have relatively  small  effects on output  and instead  are  reflected 
quickly  in prices. 
Our  analysis  is divided  into two parts. First we describe  the data  and 
present  the basic results. We estimate the output-inflation  trade-off  for 
43 industrialized  countries and examine the relationship  between the 
trade-off  and  average  inflation  and  demand  variability.  Then  we consider 
econometric  issues raised by our procedure  and examine variations  on 
our  basic test. 
DATA  AND  BASIC  RESULTS 
The data  we examine, originally  from  International Financial  Statis- 
tics of the International  Monetary  Fund, are from the IMF databank  of 
39. For a recent  real  business-cycle  model, see Edward  C. Prescott, "Theory  Ahead 
of  Business  Cycle  Measurement,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis  Quarterly 
Review,  vol. 10  (Fall 1986),  pp. 9-22. 
40. Robert  G. King and Charles  I. Plosser, "Money, Credit, and Prices in a Real 
Business  Cycle,  " American  Economic  Rev iew, vol. 74  (June  1984),  pp.  363-80;  N. Gregory 
Mankiw,  "Real Business Cycles: A Neo-Keynesian  Perspective,"  Jolurnal of Economic 
Perspectives,  forthcoming. 34  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
Data  Resources, Inc. All the data  are  annual.  Depending  on the country, 
output  is real GNP or real GDP, whichever  is available.  We denote the 
log of output  as y and the log of the corresponding  nominal  quantity  as 
x. The log of the price level is then p  = x  -  y. 
We  wanted  the  most  extensive  possible  sample  of large,  industrialized, 
free market  economies. We used the following  five criteria  for choosing 
the sample  of countries:  the population  had to be at least one million;  at 
least 10 percent  of output  had to be in manufacturing;  not more than 30 
percent  of output  could  be in agriculture;  data  had  to be available  at least 
back to 1963;  the economy had to be largely  unplanned.  Information  on 
the first three criteria  was taken from the IMF's Yearbook  of National 
Account Statistics and the International Financial Statistics  Yearbooks; 
data  for the year 1965  were used for these criteria.  The fifth  criterion  is 
obviously open to interpretation.  It led us to exclude such countries  as 
Czechoslovakia,  East Germany,  and Yugoslavia. 
The countries  are  listed in table  3, together  with the period  of time  for 
which data are available. We present here some sample statistics for 
each country:  the mean  and  standard  deviation  for real  growth,  inflation, 
and the growth  in nominal  demand.  We see from this table that there is 
substantial  variation  in the macroeconomic  experiences of these coun- 
tries. For example, Panama  had the lowest average inflation  rate, less 
than 3 percent a year, while Argentina  and Brazil each had average 
inflation  exceeding  40 percent  a year. 
Estimating the Output-Inflation Trade-off.  We express the short-run 
output-inflation  trade-off  by estimating  the following  equation: 
(14)  Yt =  constant  +  TX  lXt  +  X Yt  -I  +  y Time. 
The log of real GNP is regressed on its own lag, a time trend, and the 
change in nominal  GNP. This sort of equation has been used widely, 
both by new classical macroeconomists  such as Robert Lucas and by 
Keynesian  macroeconomists  such as Charles  Schultze.41  Equation  14  is 
the empirical  counterpart  of equation 12 of our theoretical model. It 
differs from equation 12 by the use of discrete rather  than continuous 
time  and  by summarizing  the effects of past  demand  movements  through 
41. Lucas, "Some International  Evidence"; Charles  L. Schultze, "Cross-Country 
and Cross-Temporal  Differences in Inflation  Responsiveness," American Economic 
Review,  vol. 74 (May 1984,  Papers  and  Proceedings,  1983),  pp. 160-65. Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David  Romeer  35 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics on Inflation and Output, Various Countries, Selected 
Periods,  1948-86 
Real growth  Inflationz  Nomninial  growth 
Sample  Standard  Stanidard  Stanidard 
Country  per  iod  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation  Meani  deviation 
Argentina  1963-81  0.0262  0.04253  0.5439  0.42064  0.5702  0.40685 
Australia  1949-85  0.0416  0.02446  0.0677  0.05043  0.1094  0.04880 
Austria  1950-86  0.0396  0.02615  0.0526  0.04745  0.0923  0.04329 
Belgium  1950-85  0.0329  0.02238  0.0424  0.03028  0.0754  0.03343 
Bolivia  1958-83  0.0376  0.03839  0.2012  0.29272  0.2388  0.26608 
Brazil  1963-84  0.0633  0.05500  0.4237  0.25825  0.4871  0.23597 
Canada  1948-85  0.0436  0.02605  0.0480  0.03296  0.0917  0.03696 
Colombia  1950-85  0.0465  0.01881  0.1371  0.06849  0.1836  0.06394 
Costa Rica  1960-86  0.0459  0.03809  0.1241  0.13105  0.1701  0.10563 
Denmark  1950-85  0.0318  0.02451  0.0634  0.02869  0.0953  0.02812 
Dominican  Republic  1950-86  0.0493  0.05084  0.0534  0.07553  0.1028  0.09106 
Ecuador  1950-85  0.0569  0.04195  0.0877  0.10082  0.1447  0.09687 
El Salvador  1951-86  0.0328  0.04140  0.0507  0.08044  0.0837  0.07675 
Finland  1950-85  0.0429  0.03339  0.0749  0.05648  0.1178  0.06088 
France  1950-85  0.0415  0.01987  0.0675  0.03798  0.1091  0.03118 
Germany  1950-86  0.0455  0.03548  0.0374  0.02125  0.0830  0.03705 
Greece  1948-86  0.0549  0.03872  0.0915  0.06568  0.1465  0.05949 
Guatemala  1950-83  0.0425  0.02802  0.0374  0.05120  0.0799  0.05812 
Iceland  1948-85  0.0353  0.05647  0.1977  0.14758  0.2331  0.13415 
Iran  1959-85  0.0575  0.08270  0.0937  0.12213  0.1514  0.13114 
Ireland  1948-85  0.0319  0.02375  0.0741  0.05432  0.1061  0.06096 
Israel  1953-82  0.0745  0.04307  0.2119  0.24465  0.2865  0.22193 
Italy  1950-85  0.0433  0.02775  0.0796  0.05715  0.1229  0.04683 
Jamaica  1960-85  0.0153  0.04616  0.1113  0.08769  0.1267  0.06723 
Japan  1952-85  0.0716  0.03642  0.0472  0.03772  0.1189  0.04482 
Mexico  1948-85  0.0577  0.03069  0.1392  0.15016  0.1969  0.13479 
Netherlands  1950-85  0.0388  0.02918  0.0493  0.03399  0.0882  0.03779 
Nicaragua  1960-83  0.0377  0.08672  0.0806  0.09377  0.1184  0.09897 
Norway  1950-86  0.0416  0.01618  0.0564  0.05166  0.0982  0.04576 
Panama  1950-86  0.0537  0.03315  0.0299  0.03548  0.0837  0.04613 
Peru  1960-84  0.0354  0.04342  0.2554  0.22662  0.2909  0.20236 
Philippines  1948-86  0.0484  0.03216  0.0720  0.08221  0.1205  0.06948 
Portugal  1953-82  0.0510  0.02771  0.0739  0.07211  0.1250  0.06844 
Singapore  1960-84  0.0861  0.04680  0.0356  0.04768  0.1218  0.05245 
South  Africa  1948-86  0.0383  0.02279  0.0718  0.05457  0.1102  0.05012 
Spain  1954-84  0.0455  0.03085  0.0992  0.04698  0.1448  0.04393 
Sweden  1950-86  0.0301  0.01795  0.0635  0.03776  0.0937  0.03169 
Switzerland  1948-86  0.0286  0.03415  0.0387  0.02672  0.0674  0.03217 
Tunisia  1960-83  0.0621  0.04424  0.0596  0.05795  0.1217  0.05419 
United Kingdom  1948-86  0.0243  0.01890  0.0664  0.04984  0.0909  0.04202 
United States  1948-86  0.0315  0.02676  0.0415  0.02529  0.0731  0.03252 
Venezuela  1950-85  0.0459  0.03757  0.0526  0.08237  0.0985  0.07665 
Zaire  1950-84  0.0334  0.04248  0.2002  0.22374  0.2338  0.21167 
Across-country  values 
Mean  0.0441  0.03591  0.1048  0.09303  0.1489  0.08881 
Standard  deviation  0.0138  0.0147  0.0999  0.0843  0.1003  0.0776 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  with  data  from  International  Monetary  Fund,  Itnternational Financial  Statistics.  The 
data  were obtained  from  the IMF  data  bank  of Data  Resources,  Inc. All data  are annual.  Depending  on the country, 
output  is real GNP or real GDP, whichever  is available.  Growth  rates are computed  as differences  in logarithms 
with the log of real output  as y and the log of nominal  output  as x: the log of the price level is p  = x  -  y. For 
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Table 4.  Estimates of the Output-Inflation Trade-off, Various Countries, 
Selected Periods,  1948-86a 
Fiull samtiple  Data  thlrt-ough  1972  Data  qfter 1972 
Tralde-off  Tratde-ojf  Tr-ade-off 
para-  para-  para- 
Samtple  meter,  Stanidar-d  mneter,  Staidar-d  mneter,  Statndar-d 
Counitity  period  X  etrror  Xr  ' rot  Xr  error 
Argentina  1963-81  -0.0047  0.0335  -0.1179  0.1140  0.0021  0.0322 
Auistralia  1949-85  0.1383  0.0862  0.3029  0.0858  0.3196  0.1937 
Austria  1950-86  -  0.0196  0.1069  -  0.0830  0.1219  0.6823  0.2058 
Belgium  1950-85  0.4967  0.1035  0.3897  0.1036  0.2081  0.2950 
Bolivia  1958-83  -0.0525  0.0424  0.1418  0.1567  -0.0621  0.0276 
Brazil  1963-84  -0.0951  0.1037  -0.1999  0.2111  0.0770  0.1478 
Canada  1948-85  0.4731  0.0899  0.5052  0.1151  0.4619  0.2333 
Colombia  1950-85  0.0550  0.0879  -0.0233  0.0919  0.2089  0.2151 
Costa  Rica  1960-86  --0.2302  0.0911  0.4041  0.1937  -0.2912  0.0722 
Denmark  1950-85  0.8486  0.1385  0.6762  0.1491  1.0091  0.5805 
Dominican  Republic  1950-86  0.3993  0.0750  0.5689  0.0591  -0.1173  0.0733 
Ecuador  1950-85  0.1976  0.1148  0.4903  0.2042  - 0.2062  0.1226 
El Salvador  1951-86  0.3432  0.0822  0.4368  0.1162  0.3230  0.1127 
Finland  1950-85  0.2417  0.0823  0.2242  0.1000  0.5835  0.1139 
France  1950-85  -0.0648  0.0899  0.1046  0.0765  0.3858  0.3129 
Germany  1950-86  0.6137  0.1005  0.6182  0.1369  1.0761  0.1333 
Greece  1948-86  0.2577  0.0974  0.4528  0.0644  0.4583  0.2869 
Guatemala  1950-83  0.3966  0.0772  0.3705  0.1036  0.5021  0.1377 
Iceland  1948-85  0.0154  0.1173  0.3892  0.1978  -0.2487  0.2236 
Iran  1959-85  0.3785  0.1097  0.1081  0.0834  0.5018  0.2084 
Ireland  1948-85  0.2731  0.0710  0.3767  0.1074  0.1306  0.1733 
Isi-ael  1953-82  0.0015  0.0847  0.4082  0.0928  0.0901  0.0372 
Italy  1950-85  0.2035  0.1007  0.5279  0.1363  0.5470  0.1276 
Jamaica  1960-85  0.1399  0.1591  -0.0977  0.3055  0.2389  0.1169 
Japan  1952-85  0.5065  0.1524  0.4812  0.1363  0.4119  0.2441 
Mexico  1948-85  -0.1095  0.0530  0.3139  0.0491  -0.4304  0.0997 
Netherlands  1950-85  0.4546  0.1244  0.3245  0.1802  0.5214  0.3035 
Nicaragua  1960-83  0.5834  0.1551  0.8431  0.1833  0.6332  0.4505 
Norway  1950-86  -0.0448  0.0625  -0.0875  0.0719  0.0402  0.1748 
Panama  1950-86  0.5969  0.0858  0.5775  0.0900  0.6592  0.0811 
Peru  1960-84  -0.0713  0.1171  0.1116  0.1696  0.0419  0.2337 
Philippines  1948-86  0.0424  0.0762  0.2202  0.1069  -0.2266  0.0721 
Portugal  1953-82  0.1769  0.1692  0.3533  0.2599  0.3291  0.2994 
Singapore  1960-84  0.6022  0.1369  1.0316  0.3661  0.3166  0.0477 
South Africa  1948-86  0.2017  0.0763  0.2615  0.0914  0.3203  0.1317 
Spain  1954-84  0.3507  0.1255  0.5020  0.0945  0.3289  0.0699 
Sweden  1950-86  0.0067  0.0971  0.1648  0.1015  0.4184  0.1732 
Switzerland  1948-86  0.8264  0.1137  0.7475  0.1254  0.7940  0.1693 
Tunisia  1960-83  0.5251  0.1703  0.7856  0.2896  0.1342  0.1536 
United  Kingdom  1948-86  -0.0199  0.0958  0.0793  0.1293  -0.0766  0.2197 
United  States  1948-86  0.6714  0.0771  0.7229  0.0598  0.8486  0.1915 
Venezuela  1950-85  0.1146  0.0623  0.3252  0.1239  -0.0240  0.0784 
Zaire  1950-84  0.0160  0.0414  -0.0188  0.0419  -0.0502  0.0984 
Across-country  values 
Mean  0.2419  0.0985  0.3422  0.1348  0.2761  0.1739 
Standard deviation  0.2719  0.0326  0.2796  0.0695  0.3463  0.1089 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  using  equation  14.  The  data  uised in  the  estimation  are  from  IMF,  ltiternatiotnal 
Finiatncial  Statistics. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the log of real output. y,. The output-inflation trade-off parameter, T,  is the coefficient 
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the term  in  lagged  real  output.  We  discuss this specification  of the output- 
inflation  trade-off  further  in the second part  of this section. 
The coefficient  of the change  in nominal  demand,  7,  is the parameter 
of central interest. It tells us how much of a shock to nominal GNP 
shows up in output in the first year. If T  =  1, then all of the change in 
nominal  GNP shows up in real GNP; if T  =  0, then all the change in 
nominal  GNP shows up in prices. 
Table  4 presents  the estimated  value of  7 for the 43 countries,  together 
with  the estimated  standard  errors.  For  each country,  the  entire  available 
time series is used in the estimation.  Table  4 also presents  the estimated 
value of T  for two subsamples.  We use 1972-73  as the cutoff  between the 
two subsamples.  The early 1970s  are often considered a time of major 
structural  change; certainly many empirical  macroeconomic  relation- 
ships broke down. We therefore wanted to see whether the trade-off 
parameter  T  changed  and, if so, whether  the changes  could  be explained. 
Table 4 shows substantial  variation  in the output-inflation  trade-off 
across countries. The mean value of T  for our 43 countries  is 0.242 and 
the standard  deviation  is 0.272. The trade-off  parameter  for the United 
States  is 0.671, which  is 1.6 standard  deviations  above the mean.  Hence, 
relative  to the typical country  in our sample, the United States exhibits 
large  effects of aggregate  demand  on output. 
Table 4 shows that the trade-off  parameter  sometimes changes sub- 
stantially  from the period  through  1972  to the period  after 1972.  For the 
United States, there  is little change  in the estimate. But in 63 percent  of 
the countries, one can reject the hypothesis of no change in 7  at the 5 
percent level. Across countries, the correlation  between 7  estimated 
with the earlier  data and the 7  estimated with the later data is 0.36. It 
appears  that  there  can  be substantial  change  in the output-inflation  trade- 
off over time. 
The Determinants  of the Trade-off: Cr-oss-Section Results.  We now 
wish to see whether  the cross-country  variation  in the estimated  trade- 
off 7  can be explained. Our  theoretical  model suggests that  7  should  be 
low in countries  where the variability  of aggregate  demand  is high and 
in countries where the average level of inflation  is high. Our primary 
attention  is on these two hypotheses. 
Figures 1 and 2 present scatterplots of the trade-off parameter  T 
against  the mean  level of inflation  7r,  the log of the mean  level of inflation, 
and the standard  deviation  of the change in aggregate  demand  0rx.  Both 
pictures  display  the negative  relation  predicted  by theory. Figure 1.  The Output-Inflation Trade-off and Mean Inflation 
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Figure 2.  The Output-Inflation Trade-off and the Variability of Demand 
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Source: Output-inflation  trade-off  parameter,  T,  is from table 4. Standard  deviation  of nominal  GNP growth  is 
from  table  3. 
Figure  1  also suggests  that  the  relation  between  the  trade-off  parameter 
and mean  inflation  is nonlinear.  This result  should  not be surprising.  As 
the rate  of inflation  grows  larger,  the trade-off  parameter  should  decline. 
But we do not expect T to decline below zero. The relation  between ir 
and T should be convex. An increase in inflation  from 5 percent to 10 
percent  should  have a larger  effect on  7 than  an increase  from 10  percent 
to 15 percent. When we turn to formal estimation, therefore, a linear 
specification  is likely to be inadequate. 
Because our sample includes a few countries with extremely high 
inflation rates, it is  difficult to gauge the relationship between the 
estimated  trade-off  and mean inflation  among  low- and moderate-infla- 
tion countries from the top portion of figure 1. The bottom portion 
therefore  presents a scatterplot  of 7  against the log of mean inflation. 
That portion shows that the inverse relation  between 7  and ir  holds at 
both low and  high  inflation  rates. 40  Brookinigs  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Figure 3.  Mean Inflation and the Variability of Demand 
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Figure  3, a scatterplot  of mean  inflation  and the standard  deviation  of 
nominal  GNP growth, shows a strong  positive relation.  This figure  thus 
reestablishes the well-known fact that countries with high levels of 
inflation tend to  have unstable aggregate demand. The correlation 
between these two variables  is 0.92. We will see below, however, that 
multiple regression is able to identify separate effects of these two 
variables  on the output-inflation  trade-off. 
Table 5 presents cross-sectional  regressions  of the estimated values 
of the trade-off  parameter  T  on the mean of inflation  rr  and the standard 
deviation of aggregate  demand  growth  ax. To account for the nonline- 
arity, the squares  of these variables  are also included in some regres- 
sions.42  The last column is the most general specification;  it includes 
both variables  and allows both to enter nonlinearly.  As expected, the 
second-order  term  in mean  inflation  is statistically  significant.43 
42. Including  an interaction  term  does not affect  the results. 
43. Our  measures  of the short-run  output-inflation  trade-offs  for the countries  in our Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, anid David  Romtie,  41 
Table 5.  Determinants of the Output-Inflation Trade-off, Full Sample Perioda 
Equation  Indepetidestit 
v,ariable  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6 
Constant  0.384  0.388  0.389  0.600  0.516  0.589 
(0.053)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.079)  (0.089)  (0.086) 
Mean inflation  -  1.347  .  .  .  - 1.119  -  4.835  . .  .  -  5.729 
(0.368)  (0.919)  (1.074)  (1.973) 
Square  of mean 
inflation  . .  ..  . ..  7.118  . .  .  8.406 
(2.088)  (3.849) 
Standard  deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  .  .  1.639  -  0.322  .  .  .  -4.242  1.241 
(0.482)  (1.183)  (1.512)  (2.467) 
Square  of standard 
deviation  of 
nominal GNP growth  . .  .  .  .  .  . ..  . .  .  7.455  -  2.380 
(4.118)  (7.062) 
Summlsatay  statistic 
R'  0.228  0.2  01  0.210  0.388  0.243  0.359 
Standard  error  0.241  0.245  0.244  0.215  0.239  0.219 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  output-inflation  trade-off  parameter,  T  (estimated  in  table  4).  Numbers  in 
parentheses  are standard errors. 
The estimates in table 5 suggest that mean inflation  is a statistically 
significant  determinant  of the inflation-output  trade-off,  but  that  demand 
variability  is not. The hypothesis that inflation  and inflation  squared  do 
not enter  regression  5.6 is rejected  at the 5 percent  level. The hypothesis 
that the standard  deviation of aggregate  demand  and its square  do not 
enter  is not rejected  even at the 20 percent  level. An examination  of the 
substantive  implications  of regression 5.6 also shows that only mean 
inflation  is important.  For example, an increase  in mean  inflation  from  5 
percent  to 10  percent,  as might  be plausible  for the United  States, would 
reduce the trade-off by 0.22. An increase in ax from 5 percent to 10 
percent increases the trade-off by 0.04. Hence, only the effects of 
inflation  on the trade-off  are substantively  important. 
sample are estimates.  Because  X is the dependent variable in our cross-section  regressions, 
this measurement error does  not cause bias. But because  the measurement errors are of 
different sizes,  they cause  heteroskedasticity  in the cross-section  regression.  Using the 
estimated  variances of the errors (from the standard errors of the estimated  trade-offs), 
we can correct for the heteroskedasticity  and therefore obtain more efficient estimates. 
Our estimates  imply,  however,  that less  than a quarter of the average  variance  of the 
residuals in the cross-section  regression  is due to the errors in estimating the l's.  As  a 
result, accounting for the heteroskedasticity  has virtually no effect on the results. 42  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 6.  Determinants of the Output-Inflation Trade-off, through 1972a 
Indepenident  Equation 
variable  6.1  6.2  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.6 
Constant  0.501  0.518  0.519  0.595  0.539  0.575 
(0.053)  (0.075)  (0.069)  (0.085)  (0.165)  (0.175) 
Mean inflation  -3.051  . .  .  -  2.783  -6.081  . .  .  -  5.803 
(0.730)  (0.979)  (2.287)  (2.417) 
Square of mean 
inflation  ...  ...  ...  12.145  ...  11.939 
(8.696)  (8.946) 
Standard deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  . ..  - 3.589  -0.654  . .  .  -4.295  0.583 
(1.281)  (1.570)  (4.958)  (4.959) 
Square of standard 
deviation  of 
nominal GNP growth  ...  ...  ...  ...  3.845  -6.605 
(26.066)  (24.440) 
Ssnrnary statistic 
R2  0.281  0.140  0.267  0.298  0.119  0.266 
Standard error  0.239  0.262  0.242  0.237  0.266  0.242 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  The  equations  are specified  exactly  as  in table 5,  but are estimated  with data only  through  1972. Numbers  in 
parentheses  are standard errors. 
Note that  the estimated  effect of aggregate  demand  variability  on the 
trade-off  is positive, not negative as predicted  by theory. This result is 
not obtained when mean inflation and its square are left out of the 
regression. Yet when all the variables are included, the variability 
coefficients,  although  small  and  statistically  insignificant,  have  the wrong 
sign. This result is puzzling, and we have no definite  explanation  (but 
see the discussion  below). 
Tables 6 and 7 present the same regressions for the data ending in 
1972  and the data  beginning  in 1973.  In both subsamples  we find similar 
results.  In  high-inflation  countries,  aggregate  demand  has  a smaller  effect 
on output. 
To make clear the implications of our regression results, table 8 
presents  the predicted  values of  T for various  inflation  rates. We present 
results for each of our samples, in each case using the most general 
specification  (regressions  5.6, 6.6, and  7.6) and  assuming  ax = 3 percent. 
The results  show that  the effects of average  inflation  are  large.  At a zero 
rate of inflation,  fluctuations  in aggregate  demand  are in the first year 
reflected  two-thirds  in output  and  one-third  in prices. At a 5 percent  rate 
of inflation,  the first-year  impact  on output  is between  one-third  and  one- Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer  43 
Table 7.  Determinants of the Output-Inflation Trade-off, after 1972a 
Independeit  Equation 
v,ariable  7.1  7.2  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.6 
Constant  0.458  0.431  0.459  0.683  0.629  0.731 
(0.071)  (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.099)  (0.103)  (0.107) 
Mean inflation  -1.025  . .  .  -0.888  -  3.307  . .  .  -2.571 
(0.296)  (0.629)  (0.809)  (1.162) 
Square of mean 
inflation  ...  ...  ...  3.144  ...  2.043 
(1.051)  (1.390) 
Standard deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  .  .  1.852  -0.308  . .  .  -6.564  -  2.808 
(0.599)  (1.244)  (1.952)  (2.550) 
Square of standard 
deviation  of 
nominal GNP growth  ...  ...  ...  ...  14.375  8.827 
(5.700)  (7.192) 
Summnaty  statistic 
R2  0.207  0.169  0.189  0.336  0.265  0.328 
Standard error  0.312  0.319  0.316  0.286  0.300  0.287 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a. The  equations  are specified  exactly  as in table  5, but  are  estimated  using  data  after  1972.  Numbers  in parentheses 
are standard  errors. 
half. At a 20 percent  rate of inflation,  the estimated  first-year  impact  on 
output  is small  and sometimes  negative. 
The  Determinants  of  the  Trade-off:  Time  Series  Cross-Section 
Results. Table  9 presents cross-country  regressions  of the change  in the 
trade-off  from the first to the second subsample  on the change in the 
mean level of inflation  and the change in variability.  These regressions 
test Keynesian  and new classical theories by examining  the differences 
across countries,  not in the level of the output-inflation  trade-off,  but in 
the change in the trade-off over time. These regressions have the 
advantage  of correcting  for any fixed country  effects. For example, the 
extent of wage and price rigidity  and thus the output-inflation  trade-off 
may depend on various country-specific  institutions, such as the laws 
governing  labor  negotiations.  If such institutions  do not change  substan- 
tially  from  our  first  to our  second subsample,  then  they will not introduce 
a bias in these regressions, even if they do introduce a bias in the 
regressions  in levels.44 
44. For these fixed country  effects to bias the regressions  in levels, the fixed effects 
must  for some reason  be correlated  with  the average  level of inflation. 44  Brookings Papers  on Economnic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 8.  Predicted Output-Inflation Trade-off at Various Inflation Ratesa 
Mean  Regr-ession 
inflation 
(per-cent)  5.6  6.6  7.6 
0  0.62  0.59  0.65 
5  0.36  0.33  0.53 
10  0.14  0.13  0.42 
15  - 0.05  -  0.02  0.32 
20  -0.19  -0.10  0.22 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on regression equations  5.6,  6.6,  and 7.6 from tables 5, 6, and 7. 
a.  These  figures assuLme  the standard deviation  of nominial GNP growth,  u,r, is 3 percent. 
The results in table 9 are qualitatively  the same as those for the level 
regressions  above, but the estimated  effects are somewhat  smaller.  For 
example, regression 5.6 implies that an increase in inflation from 5 
percent to 10  percent  reduces the trade-off  by 0.22. In contrast, regres- 
sion 9.6 implies that such an increase in inflation  reduces the trade-off 
by only 0.12. This finding  may be due to the possibility of bias in the 
regression  in levels discussed above. 
There  are two other  reasons why the regression  for the change  in the 
trade-off  might  produce  smaller  effects of mean  inflation,  one statistical 
and  one economic. The statistical  reason  is that  the change  in the sample 
mean inflation  might  be a very noisy estimator  of the change  in the true 
mean inflation.  Such sampling  error  would tend to bias downward  the 
coefficients. This downward bias is probably smaller in the levels 
regression,  because the "signal-to-noise"  ratio is greater.  The noise is 
less because the sampling  error  for the level of inflation  is less than  it is 
for the change  in inflation;  the signal  is greater  because the variation  in 
the level of mean inflation  across countries  is plausibly  larger  than the 
variation in the change in mean inflation across countries. Hence, 
measurement  error  in mean  inflation  due to sampling  error  is probably  a 
more important  problem  for the regressions  in table 9 than  for those in 
tables 5, 6, and  7. 
The economic reason is that the frequency with which prices are 
adjusted  might  not change immediately  with changes in the mean level 
of inflation.  For example, a company  that issues a catalog once a year 
might  not switch to issuing a catalog  twice a year unless it were certain 
that the change in mean inflation  were permanent.  Hence, changes in 
mean inflation  observed between our two subsamples  might  have been Laurence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer  45 
Table 9.  Explaining the Change in the Output-Inflation Trade-offa 
Independent  Equation 
v,ariable  9.1  9.2  9.3  9.4  9.5  9.6 
Constant  0.009  -0.037  0.009  0.172  -0.012  0.154 
(0.078)  (0.062)  (0.085)  (0.091)  (0.059)  (0.104) 
Change in 
mean inflation  -  0.595  .  .  .  -0.603  -3.174  .  .  .  -2.619 
(0.442)  (0.773)  (0.968)  (1.458) 
Change in the 
square of mean 
inflation  ...  ...  ...  3.094  ...  1.895 
(1.054)  (1.608) 
Change in the 
standard deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  . .  .  -0.852  0.016  .  .  .  -  5.820  -  2.384 
(0.787)  (1.366)  (2.095)  (3.046) 
Change in the square 
of standard deviation 
of nominal GNP growth  ...  ...  ...  ...  14.392  9.094 
(5.678)  (8.589) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.019  0.004  -0.005  0.173  0.121  0.158 
Standard error  0.359  0.362  0.364  0.329  0.340  0.333 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a. The dependent  variable is  rTlte  -  Tearl  where  rTlte  is the estimate  of  r using data after  1972 and 
Teayl)  is the 
estimate  of X using  data  through  1972.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
perceived  as partly  transitory  and may have evoked smaller  changes in 
price-setting  behavior. 
ECONOMETRIC  ISSUES  AND  ROBUSTNESS 
Having  estimated  the  output-inflation  trade-offs  for  different  countries 
using  standard  specifications,  we next discuss econometric  issues raised 
by those specifications  and examine a series of variations  on our basic 
test. Our  central  finding,  that the effect of nominal  demand  movements 
on real  output  falls as average  inflation  rises, is robust. 
Supply Shocks.  In both the theoretical model of equations 5-13 and 
the preceding  empirical  work, we assume that all aggregate  shocks are 
demand shocks. In actual economies, of course, output movements 
result  from supply  as well as demand  shocks. The residual  of equation 
14  reflects  these supply  shocks. We now investigate  the effects of supply 
shocks on our  results. 46  Brookings  Papers  on Econiomic Activity,  1:1988 
The presence of supply  shocks can in principle  cause several  distinct 
problems.  As we explain  below, our  estimates  of the trade-off  parameter 
7  are biased if changes in nominal GNP are correlated with supply 
shocks, as can occur either if aggregate  demand  is not unit elastic or if 
supply and demand shocks are correlated. Most important, supply 
shocks can bias our estimates of the key relationship  between T and 
average  inflation.  This is the case if average  inflation  is correlated  with 
bias in the estimated T's. 
Before considering these separate problems, we perform  a simple 
check of their overall importance  by examining whether the results 
change  when we restrict  our attention  to the period  through  1972,  when 
supply shocks are generally thought to have been less  significant. 
Comparison  of tables 5 and 6 shows that ending  the sample  in 1972  has 
essentially no effect on the results. Focusing on the period after 1972, 
on the other hand, leads to weaker results, suggesting  that if supply 
shocks have any effect on our results, it is to obscure the phenomenon 
for which we are testing. 
We now turn to the specific problems caused by supply shocks, 
beginning  with  bias  in the estimates  of  T. This  parameter  gives the output 
effects of demand shocks, as measured  by Ax. Supply shocks can be 
viewed as variables  left out of the output equation, and so they cause 
bias if they are correlated  with Ax. Supply shocks directly affect Ax as 
long as the aggregate  demand  curve is not unit elastic; only with unit 
elastic demand  do the movements in p and y caused by supply shocks 
have exactly offsetting  effects on  X.45 In addition,  even if demand  is unit 
elastic, so ASx  reflects only demand  shocks, movements  in demand  and 
supply may be correlated. This is the case, for example, if monetary 
policy accommodates  supply  shocks.46 
The  importance  of these problems  is questionable.  Available  evidence 
suggests that an elasticity of  aggregate demand of  roughly one  is 
realistic.47  And the endogeneity of monetary policy can reduce bias: 
45. See Marcelle  Arak,  "Some International  Evidence  on Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs: 
Comment,"  American  Economic  Reiew,  vol. 67 (September  1977),  pp. 728-30. 
46. This discussion suggests that instrumental  variables  estimation  is unlikely  to be 
useful here. Appropriate  instruments  are variables  that affect nominal  GNP growth  and 
are uncorrelated  with supply shocks. If monetary  and fiscal policies respond  to supply 
shocks, measures  of the stance of these policies are not valid instruments.  Both for this 
reason  and  because  of data  limitations,  we do not pursue  use of instrumental  variables. 
47. For example, the values that Mankiw and Summers suggest for the relevant 
parameters  of the IS and  LM  curves  imply  an elasticity  of the aggregate  demand  curve  of Laiurence Baill, N.  Gregory A'Iankiw,  and David Rom(?eer  47 
policymakers  may respond  to supply  shocks in a way that  eliminates  the 
effects on nominal GNP. In any case, we empirically  investigate the 
importance  of biases in TX  in two ways. First, note that if aggregate 
demand has elasticity of a #/ 1, a supply shock affects x = p + y but leaves 
ap  +  y unchanged. The same is true if policyrnakers target ap  +  y rather 
than p  +  y.  If supply  shocks  leave  ap  +  y unaffected,  the effect  of 
aggregate demand movements can be estimated by regressing Yt on 
z\(apt +  yt) rather  than Ax'.48 The estimated coefficients can then be 
regressed  on average  inflation  and the standard  deviation  of changes in 
ap  +  y. Thus a check for bias caused by supply shocks is to posit a range 
of values of a and examine  whether  the results are robust  to the choice 
of a. We consider four values for a ranging from 0.5 to 2. For a  =  0.5 
the second-stage  regression  (with  quadratic  terms  included)  yields: 
Ta=0.5  =  0.812 -  6.397fr  +  10.935fr2  +  8.630cro.5p?y  -  58.140crO.5p+y, 
(0.110)  (1.628)  (3.671)  (4.704)  (30.706) 
2  = 0.421;standarderror  = 0.231, 
where  Ta O=S  denotes the coefficient  on z\(apt + y,) with a = 0.5 from  the 
first-stage  regression  (standard  errors  are in parentheses).  For a = 2, 
Ta=2  =0.211  -  2.632fir  + 3.569*2 + 0.1672fp+y  + 0.116cr2p+y, 
(0.038)  (0.995)  (1.851)  (0.585)  (0.792) 
Ri  =  0.333;standarderror  =  0.100. 
The results  are similar  to those for our baseline  case: the coefficients  on 
the average  inflation  variables  are of the predicted  sign, quantitatively 
large, and statistically significant;  the coefficients on the variability 
measures  are small, wrong-signed,  and insignificant.  (Because the units 
of  gap  +y  and Ta depend on a,  the magnitudes  of the coefficients from 
different regressions are not directly comparable.) The results for 
a  =  0.67 and  a  =  1.5 are also similar. 
A second approach  to reducing  bias in the estimates  of T is to include 
measures  of supply  shocks in our  equation  for the output-inflation  trade- 
off-that  is, to add the left-out variable.  We focus on oil price changes, 
which are the most easily identifiable  and perhaps the largest supply 
shocks during  our sample period. We do this by including  a dummy 
slightly  less than  one. N. Gregory  Mankiw  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Money  Demand 
and the Effects of Fiscal Policies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.  18 
(November  1986),  pp. 415-29. 
48. As in our  main  regressions,  we also include  a constant,  a trend,  and  y, 1. 48  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
variable  in our estimation  of the output-inflation  trade-off  (equation  14) 
that is equal  to + 1 in the years of major  oil price increases (1974, 1979, 
and 1980)  and -  I in the one year of a major  price decrease (1986).  (The 
natural  alternative  of entering  a separate  dummy  for each of these years 
is equivalent to simply discarding  these years from the sample, and 
would thus be similar  to the previous strategy  of stopping  the sample  in 
1972.)  Including  the dummy  has  little  effect on the results:  the  correlation 
of the T's estimated with and without the dummies is 0.98, and the 
regressions  of the estimated  T's  on average  inflation  and the variability 
of demand  growth  are little changed;  in fact, the magnitude  and signifi- 
cance of the effect of average  inflation  are slightly  larger. 
So far  we have addressed  the problem  of supply  shocks by attempting 
to reduce the possible bias in the estimates of T. We now turn to the 
implications  of any remaining  bias  for our  estimates  of the cross-country 
relation  between T  and average  inflation.  Bias in these estimates arises 
from biases in v only if the latter are correlated  with average  inflation. 
This correlation  could occur if the variance of supply shocks or the 
degree to which they are accommodated,  which affects the bias in T',  is 
correlated with average inflation.49  But there is no strong reason to 
expect this. For example, suppose that one country  expands aggregate 
demand in response to unfavorable supply shocks and contracts in 
response  to favorable  shocks (so that  shocks  fall mainly  on prices),  while 
another country does the reverse. The estimates of T are biased in 
different  directions  for the two countries, but the bias is not correlated 
with average  inflation  because neither  country  is pursuing  a systemati- 
cally  more  expansionary  policy  . On  the other  hand,  if one country  always 
pursues more expansionary policies, stimulating  demand after both 
favorable and unfavorable  shocks, then the countries have different 
average  inflation,  but  v is not biased  because nominal  growth  and supply 
shocks are uncorrelated. 
Although we do not think it likely that bias in T caused by supply 
shocks is correlated  with average  inflation,  we check for such a problem. 
The effects of supply shocks on the cross-country regression can be 
reduced by controlling  for differences in the size of these shocks. We 
49. Indeed,  a correlation  between  the variance  of supply  shocks and  average  inflation 
causes bias even if i is unbiased:  the size of supply shocks is a left-out variable  in the 
equation  for  T because  a large  var-iance  of supply  (like  a large  variance  of demand)  reduces 
the frequency  of price  adjustment. Laurenice  Ball, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and David Rorner  49 
experiment  with  two types of measures  of the size of supply  shocks. The 
first are country characteristics. Specifically, we use the degree of 
industrialization,  measured  by manufacturing  output as a fraction of 
total output  in 1965,  and the degree of openness, measured  by the ratio 
of imports  to output  in 1965.50  Both variables  probably  affect  a country's 
susceptibility to supply shocks. (Both could also affect the output- 
inflation trade-off in ways unrelated to supply shocks.) When these 
variables  are included  in regression  5.6, however, their  coefficients  are 
small and highly insignificant;  more important,  the coefficients on the 
remaining  variables  are virtually  unchanged. 
The second  type  of variable  that  we add  to the cross-section  regression 
is a crude  measure  of the magnitude  of supply  shocks. Since the residual 
of equation  14  reflects  supply  shocks, we use the variance  of the residual, 
E-2,  as a measure of the variance of supply shocks. We measure the 
variance  of demand  shocks by the variance  of nominal  GNP growth,  o,; 
thus  E  /zr9 is a crude proxy for the relative magnitudes  of supply and 
demand  shocks. Adding  this ratio  to our  cross-section regression  yields 
T=  0.163  -  5.421s-r  +  7.833-fr2 +  3.451c,  -  5.317-2  +  1.339(oFE c), 
(0.143)  (1.731)  (3.377)  (2.251)  (6.245)  (0.379) 
R2 = 0.508;  standard  error = 0.192. 
The coefficient on  Er/  r is positive and significant.  This could occur if 
supply  shocks fall mainly  on output  rather  than  prices, thereby  causing 
a positive bias in T,  with the size of the bias increasing  in the relative  size 
of supply  shocks. In any case, the coefficients  on the variables  of central 
interest, fr and X2,  are essentially unchanged. The effect of demand 
variability  remains  wrong-signed  and  insignificant  but is now somewhat 
larger  than  before. 
In sum, a wide variety of tests fails to provide any evidence that 
supply  shocks have an important  effect on our results. 
Specification  of the Cross-Countiy  Regression.  Another issue  con- 
cerning  our specification,  which is related to the possibility of supply 
shocks discussed above, is how to measure  aggregate  variability.  Since 
the only aggregate  shocks in our theoretical  model are demand  shocks, 
the model implies that the variance of nominal GNP growth is the 
50. We  are  unable  to obtain  data  on manufacturing  output  for  Switzerland  and  Iceland; 
we therefore  exclude  these countries  from  the regression. 50  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
appropriate  measure.  But  if the  model  were  extended  to include  aggregate 
supply  shocks, the variance  of inflation  might  be a better  measure.  The 
frequency  of price  changes, and  hence  T, would  depend  on the variances 
of both shocks. And while  o2 might  capture  only the variance  of demand 
shocks (for example, if demand is unit elastic), ur would reflect both 
variances. 
Replacing rx  with ur,  in our cross-country  regression  leads to 
T =  0.616  -  3.221fr +  4.072*2  -  2.235o7r +  5.513c7r, 
(0.085)  (2.254)  (4.098)  (2.572)  (6.708) 
R2=  0.367;  standard  error  = 0.218. 
Inflation  and inflation  squared  are now not statistically  significant.  The 
point estimates, however, continue  to suggest  that  average  inflation  has 
a large  effect on the output-inflation  trade-off;  for example, an increase 
in fr from 5 percent to 10 percent reduces T by 0.13. In addition, the 
estimated effects of variability,  although  highly imprecise, are now in 
the direction  predicted  by our model and are quantitatively  reasonable; 
they imply  that  an increase  in ur,  from 5 percent  to 10  percent  reduces  7 
by 0.07. It may be that the puzzling results in our basic specification 
concerning  the effects of variability  result from an inappropriate  vari- 
ability  measure. 
It might appear that a natural extension of this consideration of 
alternative  variability  measures  is to include  both r. and  ur,  in the cross- 
country regression. But this specification  is unlikely to provide useful 
information:  it is likely to produce  small  coefficients  on average  inflation 
regardless of whether average inflation truly affects 7.  To see why, 
suppose that  the correct  model is 
(15)  y 
where E is a supply shock that is uncorrelated  with Ax. Then, since 
IT =  AX  -  Ay,  o  -  (1-7  )2  ?+  and so 
o2  y2  (16)  (I -  T)2 =  7  -e 
Expression 16 is an identity and thus holds regardless of how 7  is 
determined.  Regressing  7 on rx  and  ur,  would  fail to produce  a perfect  fit 
only because of cross-country  variation  in re and  because the functional 
form  of equation  16  is not linear.  Adding  average  inflation  to an equation Laurence  Ball, N. Gregoty  Mankiw,  and Da'  id Romer  51 
that  is almost  an identity  does not yield a valid test of the importance  of 
this variable. For a given variance of supply shocks, the variance of 
inflation  is determined  completely by the variance of demand shocks 
(r,2)  and the proportion of each shock that is  reflected in inflation 
(1 -  T).  Thus  regressing  any one Of  T, o2, and U2 on the other  two should 
provide an excellent fit and leave little room for other explanatory 
variables. Again, this is true regardless  of whether our theory of the 
determinants  of T is correct. 
We conclude that if there were a theory that suggested that T  was a 
function of both ux and  .r., the type of test that we employ would be 
unable  to discriminate  between such a model and our model. We know 
of no such theory, however.5" 
Specification  of  the Output-Inflation Trade-off.  In the first part of 
this section, following Lucas and others, we estimated the short-run 
output-inflation  trade-off by regressing real output on the change in 
nominal  GNP and other variables. Our model, however, predicts that 
real  output  in the current  period  will  depend  on the innovation  in nominal 
GNP in the current  period  and on lagged  innovations  (see equation 12). 
Thus the theory suggests a specification  of form 
(17)  yt  =  T(x  -  Et 1 xt) +  Eloi (xt_-i  t(i+  1)  x,_,)  +  p3'Zt, 
where  E, denotes an expectation  at time  t, x is nominal  demand,  and  Z is 
a vector of other  variables  that  affect output. 
The equation that we use to estimate T,  equation 14, differs from 
equation 17 by omitting  past innovations  and by employing  the change 
in nominal  GNP rather  than  the current  innovation.  Because x,  Et - I  xt 
reflects information  learned in period t and is thus uncorrelated  with 
51. Our  discussants  consider the simple model that inflation  and output growth  are 
governed  by independent  processes and are therefore  uncorrelated.  This model is quite 
implausible.  Simple  real  business  cycle theories,  for  example,  suggest  that  real  output  and 
nominal  demand  are  determined  independently,  which  implies  that  real  growth  and  inflation 
are negatively  correlated.  More important,  the discussants' model does not  suggest a 
specification  in  which  u, and  uX  are  entered  separately.  Instead  it pi-edicts  that  the  estimated 
T should  equal 1 -  2/CU,. WhenT  is regressed  on this ratio,  average  inflation,  and  average 
inflation  squared,  the  coefficients  on the  average  inflation  variables  have  the  signs  predicted 
by our theory  and are significant  at the 1 percent  level. When  the discussants,  appealing 
to their  simple  model, regress  T on rr,  u,, and u, and their  squares  (which,  as we explain 
above, is not the specification  implied  by the model), they find, as we expect, a positive 
effect of ax,  a negative  effect of u,, and  a small  effect of 7r. 52  Brookings Papers  on Econoomic  Activity,  1:1988 
all variables  known  at time t -  1, the omission of past innovations  does 
not bias  the estimate  of  T. The  use of Axt  in place of the current  innovation 
also poses no difficulties.  A natural  way to estimate equation 17 would 
be to employ a two-stage procedure, first regressing x, on a set of 
variables  known at time t -  1 and then using the fitted  values from this 
regression  as an estimate  ofEt-1 x in equation  17.52  Estimating  equation 
14, however, is numerically  identical  to first  regressing  Ax,  on the other 
right-hand-side  variables  and  then  using  the  residuals  from  this  regression 
rather  than Ax, in equation 14. Thus equation 14 can be thought  of as a 
simple  one-step way of implementing  the two-stage  procedure,  with the 
right-hand-side  variables  for the first  regression  the same as the control 
variables  in the second stage. 
While our regression  is in principle  equivalent  to a two-stage proce- 
dure, one could argue  that our specification  in equation 14 includes too 
few  control variables to  capture expected movements in demand. 
Specifically, in countries  where expected inflation  varies considerably 
over time, a large  part  of the variation  in Ax will be predictable  (on the 
basis of lagged  Ax, for example), but cannot be predicted  using only the 
other right-hand-side  variables  of equation 14. We have also estimated 
more elaborate  versions of equation  14  in which output  depends  on two 
lags of output, current  and two lagged values of nominal  GNP, and a 
time  trend.  This specification  appears  to be rich  enough  for the residuals 
from regressing  nominal  GNP on the other right-hand-side  variables  to 
largely  represent  innovations;  for example, the residuals  do not exhibit 
serial  correlation.  For  approximately  half  of the countries,  one can  reject 
the restrictions  imposed by equation 14 in favor of the more general 
equation.  Yet the estimate of the coefficient  on nominal  GNP, which is 
our main  interest,  is not substantially  affected  by these restrictions.  For 
the United States, for example, one can reject the restrictions  in favor 
of the more  general  equation  at the 1 percent  level; yet the estimate  of T 
changes  only  from  0.642  to 0.656.  Across the  43  countries,  the correlation 
between the T  estimated  from equation 14 and the 7 estimated  from the 
more general equation  is 0.88. Moreover, using the  's from the more 
elaborate  equation  for  the cross-section  regression  has  only  minor  effects 
on the results. We thus conclude that the simpler  equation  is sufficient 
for our  purposes. 
52. See Robert  J. Barro,  "Unanticipated  Money, Output,  and the Price Level in the 
United  States," Journal of Political Econmy,  vol. 86 (August  1978),  pp. 549-80. Laursence Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiw, and David  Rome,-  53 
The parsimony of our equation also has an important statistical 
advantage. When we divide the time series in half and estimate the 
inflation-output  trade-off  for data both through  and after 1972, we are 
sometimes  left with very short  time series: less than  a dozen years. The 
simpler  equation, even if rejected by the data for the overall sample, 
may  be preferred  because  it conserves  on  the scarce  degrees  offreedom.53 
The Sample.  To examine the effects of restricting the sample of 
countries,  we limit  the sample  in two ways. First, to check whether  our 
results  depend  crucially  on a few extreme  observations,  we examine  the 
effects of excluding  countries  with  extreme  average  inflation  and  extreme 
variability  of demand  growth.  Specifically,  we drop  from  the sample  the 
six countries with average inflation  rates and standard  deviations of 
nominal  GNP  growth  greater  than  20  percent  (Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, 
Israel, Peru, and Zaire). Second, because there may be systematic 
differences  between  the  major  industrialized  countries  and  the  remaining 
countries  in our sample  that  influence  both the output-inflation  trade-off 
and average inflation  or nominal  demand variability,  we consider the 
effects of restricting  the sample to OECD countries.54  One of these 
countries,  Iceland, has both average  inflation  and standard  deviation  of 
nominal  GNP growth that are nearly double those of any of the other 
OECD  countries;  we therefore  consider  the  results  both  with  and  without 
Iceland. Of course, restrictions  on the sample  have the disadvantage  of 
discarding  some of the variation  in the right-hand-side  variables,  which 
could make the relationships  for which we are testing more difficult  to 
detect. 
53. If the theory were extended to allow demand  to follow a process other than a 
random  walk, it appears  that it would imply that information  about future changes in 
demand  would  also affect  current  output.  Indeed,  for most  of the countries  in our sample, 
changes in nominal GNP are positively serially correlated rather than white noise; 
moreover,  the degree  of serial  correlation  is positively  correlated  with average  inflation. 
Thus a conceivable  alternative  explanation  of our finding  of an inverse link between the 
estimated  T's and average  inflation  is that nominal  GNP changes are more persistent  in 
high-inflation  countries  and that they therefore  lead to larger  short-run  price responses 
even though  the frequency  of price  adjustment  is constant  across countries.  We find  this 
explanation  implausible:  a rough  calculation  using  a discrete-time  staggering  model  with 
persistent  demand  changes suggests  that the magnitude  of this effect is much  too small, 
and  testing  this explanation  directly  by adding  to the cross-section  regression  an estimate 
of the extent to which  the current  change  in nominal  GNP helps  to predict  future  changes 
given  information  previously  available  leaves the results  essentially  unchanged. 
54. There  are  21 OECD  countries  in our  sample:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  and  United  States. 54  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
When  we estimate  the cross-country  regression  with  the six countries 
with high  inflation  and  high  demand  variability  excluded, we find: 
T  =  1.042 -  10.563fr +  28.998-r2 -  5.933o>  +  40.634ux2, 
(0.253)  (4.485)  (21.968)  (7.032)  (45.214) 
R2  =  0.306;  standard  er-ror  =  0.225. 
The results are similar  to those for the full sample  of countries:  average 
inflation  has a large and statistically significant  effect on the output- 
inflation  trade-off  (inflation  and inflation  squared  are  jointly significant 
at the 1 percent level), while variability  has a small and insignificant 
impact  on the trade-off. 
As before, we also regress the change in the trade-off  between the 
period  ending  in 1972  and  the period  beginning  in 1973  on the changes  in 
average  inflation  and  aggregate  demand  variability.  This yields 
AT  = 0.189 -  3.089AfTr  -  0.514ATr2  -  12.163Aox +  80.887Aix2, 
(0.126)  (2.554)  (5.522)  (5.113)  (32.505) 
R2  =  0.324;  standard  error  =  0.315. 
The change  in average  inflation  has an important  effect on the change  in 
the trade-off;  the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on A-tr  and  A-t2 are 
zero is rejected at the 5 percent level. The estimated relationship  is 
essentially linear. Changes  in variability  also have an important  effect 
on the trade-off.  As ix rises, increases  in zrx  first  lower and then raise  T. 
Table 10 presents the results for OECD countries. We estimate the 
cross-country  equation  for our entire sample of years and for the two 
subsamples. In all cases, the inflation  coefficients have the predicted 
signs  and  are  large.  As expected, however, they are estimated  much  less 
precisely than for the larger sample of countries. Consequently, the 
results are often not statistically significant.  For the entire sample of 
years, the inflation  coefficients  are  jointly significant  only when Iceland 
is excluded (column 4). This regression implies that an increase in 
inflation  from 4.5 percent to 7.9 percent, which is from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard  deviation above the mean, 
reduces the trade-off  parameter  T  by 0.32. 
Finally, we estimate the determinants  of the change in the trade-off 
for OECD countries. The results are little affected by the inclusion of 
quadratic  terms or by whether Iceland is included in the sample. We 
therefore focus on the linear specification  with Iceland included. We 
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Table 10.  Determinants of the Output-Inflation Trade-off for OECD Countriesa 
Equationi 
Iceland included  Icelanid  excluded 
Trade-off  Trade-off 
Independent  Trade-off,  through  Tr  ade-off  Trade-off,  through  Trade-off 
vatiable  full sample  1972  after 1972 full sample  1972  after 1972 
Constant  1.073  0.840  1.124  4.369  1.470  2.215 
(0.413)  (0.673)  (0.532)  (1.082)  (0.955)  (0.832) 
Mean inflation  -21.831  -19.665  -  6.450  -  68.672  -  47.146  -17.881 
(17.608)  (14.220)  (4.941)  (20.279)  (32.716)  (8.361) 
Square of mean 
inflation  118.022  144.447  20.284  477.128  460.137  76.422 
(126.624)  (101.199)  (21.167)  (150.937)  (353.076)  (39.482) 
Standard deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  9.020  7.343  1.485  -77.961  4.061  -37.254 
(30.008)  (28.282)  (40.461)  (36.209)  (28.613)  (45.024) 
Square of standard 
deviation  of nominal 
GNP growth  -140.708  -117.567  -258.212  804.893  -79.342  326.317 
(298.452)  (320.871)  (575.272)  (379.404)  (324.757)  (651.012) 
Summarv  statistic 
R'  0.147  -  0.036  0.453  0.457  0.008  0.395 
Standard error  0.264  0.243  0.246  0.210  0.244  0.235 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  The dependent variable is the output-inflation trade-off parameter, T,  estimated in table 4. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
AT= 0.192  -  2.580A/r -  7.428Aa, 
(0.068)  (0.792)  (2.779) 
R  =  0.583;  standard  error  =  0. 189. 
Both coefficients have the expected sign and are large and statistically 
significant,  and  the fit is excellent. 
Output  Variability.  If higher  average  inflation  reduces  the real  effects 
of nominal  disturbances,  it also reduces the variability  of output.  In our 
theoretical  model, equation 12 shows that the variance  of y falls when 
1 -  w(.) falls. Thus another  test of Keynesian theory is to examine  the 
link between average inflation  and output variability.  As before, new 
classical theories, because they attribute  fluctuations  to unanticipated 
nominal disturbances  and to real shocks, predict no role for average 
inflation. 
In estimating the relation between output variability  and average 
inflation,  it is of course necessary to control  for the variance  of nominal 
GNP growth. Both Keynesian theories and Lucas's imperfect  informa- 56  Brookings  Paper-s  on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
tion theory predict that an increase in the size of nominal  shocks will 
increase the variance  of output  (in both Lucas's theory and our model, 
the direct  effect of increased  shocks is only partially  offset by a smaller 
responsiveness of output to shocks). Because the variance  of nominal 
GNP growth is highly correlated  with average inflation, omitting this 
variable  could cause severe bias. 
Table 11 reports  the results.55  Output  variability  is measured  by the 
standard  deviation  of real GNP growth  uY.  The first  two columns show 
that the variability  of output growth is positively correlated  with both 
mean  inflation  and  demand  variability.  Regression  11.3  shows the effects 
of including  both variables  on the right-hand  side. The estimated  effect 
of fr  is negative and that of  r, positive. As before, there are reasons to 
expect nonlinearities:  the negative impact of mean inflation should 
diminish  as mean inflation  rises, and the positive impact of variability 
should also fall as variability  rises. The final  column of table 11 reports 
the results with quadratic  terms included. All four variables  have the 
signs predicted  by Keynesian  theory, and  all of the t-statistics  exceed 3. 
The  implied  effects are  large:  an  increase  in mean  inflation  from  5 percent 
to 10  percent  reduces  the standard  deviation  of output  growth,  oy, by 1.2 
percentage  points, while  an  increase  in  the standard  deviation  of nominal 
growth from 5 percent to  10 percent increases u1, by 2.1 percentage 
points. This finding  of a strong  inverse link between mean  inflation  and 
output variability  confirms  the predictions of Keynesian theories and 
contradicts  those of new classical theories.56 
Reexamining Previous Evidence.  Numerous  studies have examined 
Lucas's proposition  that the variability  of aggregate  demand  affects the 
output-inflation  trade-off.  Here we reexamine  several such studies and 
show that the evidence provided  by other authors  largely supports  our 
claim  that  average  inflation  is an important  determinant  of the trade-off. 
55. The  links  between  output  variability,  average  inflation,  and  demand  variability  are 
also examined  in Lawrence  H. Summers  and Sushil  B. Wadhwani,  "Some International 
Evidence  on Labour  Cost  Flexibility  and  Output  Variability,"  Working  Paper  981  (Centre 
for Labour  Economics,  June 1987). 
56. The results  for the two subperiods  and  for the change  between  the two subperiods 
point  in the same  direction  as the results  for the full sample  but  are  less clear-cut.  Both  for 
the period  through  1972  and  for  the change  between  the two subperiods  the point  estimates 
imply large negative effects of inflation  on output variability.  The estimates are highly 
imprecise,  however;  the null  hypothesis  of no effect cannot  be rejected  in either  case. For 
the post-  1972  period  the point  estimates  imply  that  the effect  of average  inflation  on output 
variability  is not monotonic:  it is negative  at low inflation  rates  but  becomes  positive  near 
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Table 11. Determinants  of Output  Variabilitya 
Itndependent  Equation 
vatiable  11.1  11.2  11.3  11.4  11.5  11.6 
Constant  0.0315  0.0290  0.0290  0.0270  0.0174  0.0202 
(0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.003 1)  (0.0053)  (0.0047)  (0.0044) 
Mean inflation  0.0418  . .  .  -0.0817  0.1150  . .  .  -0.3254 
(0.0220)  (0.0507)  (0.0719)  (0. 1009) 
Square of mean 
inflation  ...  . ...  .  .  -0.1494  ...  0.6294 
(0.1398)  (0. 1967) 
Standard deviation 
of nominal 
GNP growth  .  .  .  0.0777  0.1740  ..  .  0.3143  0.6581 
(0.0270)  (0.0653)  (0.0786)  (0.1261) 
Square of standard 
deviation  of 
nominal GNP growth  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.6779  -  1.572 
(0.2140)  (0.361) 
Suimmnaty  statistic 
R2  0.058  0.148  0.180  0.062  0.302  0.429 
Standard  error  0.0144  0.0137  0.0135  0.0144  0.0124  0.0112 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text descnrption. 
a.  Dependent  variable is output variability, measured by the standard deviation  of real GNP growth, (ry. Numbers 
in parentheses  are standard errors. 
Lucas originally  examined  18  countries  with data  from 1952  to 1967.57 
Our cross-country  regression using the trade-offs  estimated by Lucas 
and  his sample  statistics  yields: 
T =  0.929 -  6.0341T  +  19.641fr2  -  8.397acr  +  32.369c2,, 
(0.304)  (5.698)  (24.967)  (9.435)  (43.212) 
R2 = 0.446;standarderror  = 0.185. 
Alberro  redid  Lucas's study with a sample  of 49 countries.58  The cross- 
country  regression  estimated  with Alberro's  figures  is: 
v  =  0.752 -  6.620Tr  +  14.763Tr2  +  0.158ux - 
5.230ux2,  (0.089)  (2.021)  (7.150)  (1.875)  (4.325) 
R'  = 0.418;  standard  error = 0.242. 
Both Lucas's and Alberro's  estimates  provide  strong  support  for our 
hypothesis  that  high  rates of inflation  reduce the real impact  of nominal 
demand.  The estimated  effects of average  inflation  are  large.  An increase 
in average  inflation  from  5 percent  to 10  percent  implies  a fall in T  of 0.15 
57. Lucas, "Some International  Evidence." 
58. Jose  Alberro,  "The  Lucas  Hypothesis  and  the  Phillips  Curve:  Further  International 
Evidence,"  Journal of Monetaty Economics,  vol. 7 (March 1981), pp. 239-50. 58  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
when Lucas's figures  are used and of 0.22 when Alberro's figures  are 
used. These results  are  quite  similar  to those we obtained  in table  8, even 
though the periods of time and samples of countries are substantially 
different.  Hence, the results of Lucas and Alberro  provide support  for 
new Keynesian  rather  than  new classical theories  of the business cycle. 
We have also examined the evidence of Kormendi  and Meguire  on 
the output  effects of unanticipated  money.59  A cross-country  regression 
of their estimate of the impact of unanticipated  changes in the money 
supply, which they call X, on their  estimate of the variance  of unantici- 
pated  money and  on the average  rate  of inflation  yields: 
X =  0.906  -  3.508'Tr  +  19.422fT2  -  15.908U,m +  94.093  UM, 
(0.230)  (5.390)  (33.844)  (6.055)  (47.834) 
R2=  0.303;  standard  error  = 0.140. 
(Since  Kormendi  and  Meguire  do not  provide  the average  rate  of inflation, 
we obtain it from our sample. We restrict the regression to the 26 
countries  for which we can match  their sample  period  exactly.) 
In contrast to the results of Lucas and Alberro, the estimates of 
Kormendi and Meguire do not provide support for our hypothesis. 
Inflation  has little  effect on X.  while the variance  of unanticipated  money 
appears an important  determinant. There are a variety of ways to 
reconcile  this finding  with the previous  results. 
One possibility is that money is measured with error and that the 
extent of measurement  error  varies across countries. Greater  measure- 
ment error  in the money supply  would tend to reduce the estimate of X 
while increasing  the variability  of unanticipated  money. Measurement 
error  would  also make  it more  difficult  to isolate the effect of inflation  on 
the trade-off. 
A second possibility  is that  money  may  be a bad  measure  of aggregate 
demand. If different countries follow different policies regarding  the 
extent to which they offset exogenous demand  shocks, such as changes 
in monetary  velocity, then X  will again  be a noisy measure. 
An examination  of the estimated  X suggests it is not a good measure 
of the real impact of aggregate  demand. In particular,  the correlation 
between the estimates of X  provided  by Kormendi  and Meguire  and the 
59. Roger  C. Kormendi  and Philip  G. Meguire,  "Cross-Regime  Evidence of Macro- 
economic Rationality,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 92 (October  1984),  pp. 875- 
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estimates of T  we obtain  for the same 26 countries over the same time 
samples  is only  0.38. Moreover,  the United  States  appears  a very  unusual 
country.  The estimated  X  for the United States is 0.96, the largest  in the 
sample. The second biggest X is  0.38 for Belgium. Since it seems 
implausible  that  the  United  States  is such  an  extreme  outlier,  we conclude 
that X  is probably  not a good measure  of the output-inflation  trade-off. 
A third  possibility is that high average inflation,  by increasing  price 
flexibility, reduces the effects of  aggregate demand on output but 
increases  the effect of money on aggregate  demand. In this case, the 
influence  of average inflation  on the net effect of money on output is 
ambiguous. DeLong and Summers present a model in which price 
flexibility  increases  the effect of monetary  shocks on demand  by increas- 
ing the variability  of expected inflation.60  Future research might use 
cross-country data to untangle the effects of price flexibility on the 
money-demand  and  demand-output  links. 
Conclusion 
We have examined  the short-run  trade-off  between output  and infla- 
tion using international  data. A robust finding  is that this trade-off  is 
affected  by the average  rate of inflation.  In countries  with low inflation, 
the short-run  Phillips curve is relatively flat-fluctuations in nominal 
aggregate  demand  have large effects on output. In countries  with high 
inflation,  the Phillips  curve  is steep-fluctuations in  demand  are  reflected 
quickly  in the price level. The same finding  emerges when we examine 
the change in the trade-off over time. Countries that experience an 
increase in average inflation also typically experience an increased 
responsiveness  of prices to aggregate  demand. 
Our  finding  has three important  implications.  First, it provides evi- 
dence against  new classical theories of the output-inflation  trade-off.  In 
his classic study, Lucas found  that  international  differences  in the trade- 
off were related  to differences  in the variability  of aggregate  demand  and 
interpreted  his finding  as evidence for the imperfect  information  theory 
of the business cycle. This theory, however, predicts  that the trade-off 
60. J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Is Increased  Price  Flexibility 
Stabilizing?"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 76 (December  1986),  pp. 1031-44. 60  Brookings  Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
should not be related to average inflation.  It is therefore inconsistent 
with our empirical  results. 
Second, our  finding  supports  new Keynesian  theories  of the business 
cycle  that derive nominal rigidities from optimizing behavior. Our 
theoretical  model  of price  adjustment  shows that  macroeconomic  effects 
of the sort we observe can result  from empirically  plausible  microeco- 
nomic  parameters.  In particular,  average  inflation  can strongly  influence 
the output-inflation  trade-off  through  its effects on the frequency  of price 
changes. 
Third,  our finding  implies  that  the trade-off  faced by macroeconomic 
policymakers  depends  on the average  rate  of inflation  and  that  it changes 
when the average  rate  of inflation  changes.  This  effect is substantial  even 
for moderate  rates of inflation.  Our estimates using the entire sample 
imply that the real impact of aggregate  demand is twice as great at 5 
percent  inflation  as at 10  percent  inflation.  Perhaps  the short-run  Phillips 
curve Alan Greenspan  is facing today is not the same one that Paul 
Volcker  faced a decade ago. 
APPENDIX 
THIS  APPENDIX  describes  how we solve our model  of nominal  rigidity. 
The Behavior of p(t) for a Given X 
The first  step is to derive the behavior  of the aggregate  price level for 
a given interval  between price  changes, X.  Substituting  the formula  for a 
firm's profit-maximizing  price, equation 5, into the price-setting  rule, 
equation  7, yields 
(A.1)  pi  E,{p(t  + s)  +  v[y(t  + s)  -y(t  +  s)]}ds  +  Oi(t). 
Let Q(t)  be the average  of all  prices  that  are  set at t. Equation  A. 1  implies 
1  X 
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where the Oi's  average to zero because they are uncorrelated  across 
firms. Using  the facts  that y(t)  =  x(t)  -  p(t),  Etx(t  +  s)  = x(t)  +  gs 
(because x follows a random  walk with drift), and y(t) =  pit, we can 
rewrite  equation  A.2 as 
Q(t) =(1-  v)  E,p(t  +  s)ds 
(A. 3)  A s=0 
+  vx(t)  +  '  2  VI(t  +2 
The aggregate  price level, p(t), is the average  of prices in effect at t. 
Given our assumption  of staggered  price setting, this means that  p(t) is 
the average of prices set from t -  X  to X: 
(A.4)  p(t)  Q(t -  s)ds. 
Substituting  equation  A.4 into equation  A.3 yields 
(A.5)  Q(t)  =  (1  -  v)  A  Et  -  Q(t  +  s  -  r) dr ds 
+  vx(t)  +  v  2  v,  (  + 
1  [2 
-(1-  v)  IL  (A-s)Q(t  -  s)ds 
X2 L 
+ f(XA-s)EtQ  (t+s) ds 
+  vx(t)  +  v  VV(t  + 
According  to equation  A.4, prices set at t depend  on prices set between 
t -  X  and t, which are still in effect, and on expectations of prices set 
between t and t + X,  the period  when prices set at t are in effect. 
Equation  A.4 gives an expression for Q in terms of its own past and 
expected future values. Our  goal is to solve for Q as a function of the 
underlying  demand disturbances. To do this we use the method of 
undetermined  coefficients.  That  is, we posit a solution  of form 
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and then solve for A, B, and q(*).  The term q(s;X) is the fraction of a 
nominal  shock  at  t -  s that  is passed  into  newly  set prices  at  t. Substituting 
equation  A.6 into equation  A.5 and simplifying,  we obtain 
(A.7)  A +  Bt  +  f  q(s;X)dZ(t-s) 
-  (1-v)A  +  (I-v)Bt 
Mini(s,X) 
+  (1-v)21  (X- r)q(s-r;X)  dr 
+  j  (X-r)q(s+r;X)dr  dZ(t-s)  +  vgt 
r=0 
+  t5  dZ(t -  ) +  vgA 
For equation  A.7 to hold, the constant  terms, the coefficients  on t, and 
the coefficients on dZ(t -  s) on the two sides of the equation  must be 
equal. Setting  them  equal  leads to 
(A.8)  A=(g-V)  ;  2~ 
B=  g-F; 
q(s;X) =  v +  (1 -  v)  [2  (X -  r)q(s -  r;X)  dr- 
+  (X  -  r)q(s +  r;X)  dr 
The last equation  in equation  A.8 defines  q(.;X)  implicitly.  We cannot 
find a closed-form  solution for q(.;X).61  Finding  q(*)  numerically,  how- 
ever, is straightforward.  We do this by making  an initial  guess of q(.;X), 
substituting  this guess of the function  into  the right-hand  side of equation 
A.7 (approximating  the integrals  numerically),  thereby  obtaining  a new 
q(.;X), and then iterating this procedure until q(.;X) converges.62 
61. Because q(s;x) equals  a constant  plus a weighted  sum  of values  of q(e;X)  with sum 
of weights  less than  one, a solution  to equation  A.7 exists and  is unique. 
62. The specifics  of the algorithm  are  as follows. Since we know  that  q(e;X)  converges 
to one as s approaches  infinity,  we assume  that  q(e;k)  = 1  for  s  >  T, T = 9 (time  is measured Laurence  Ball,  N.  Grego,y  Mankiw, and David  Rome,  63 
All that remains  to describe  the behavior  of the economy for a given 
X  is to translate  the results concerning  the behavior  of newly set prices 
into  a description  of the behavior  of the price  level. Substituting  equation 
A.6 and  the solutions  for A and B into equation  A.4 leads to 
(A.9)  p(t) =  (g -  )t +  w(s;x) dZ(t -  s) 
=  =o 
t ni  n(s A) 
w(s;)  =  f  q(s -r;X)  dr. 
=  =o 
The first  line in equation  A.9 is the formula  for the aggregate  price level 
in the text (equation  10).  We compute  w(.) using  the second line.63 
As described  in  the text, the solution  forp(t)  leads  directly  to a solution 
f*or  the real  effects of nominal  shocks. 
lThe  Equilibrium K 
We now describe how we solve for the equilibrium  interval  between 
price  changes, XE. Recall that  XE  is the solution  to equation 13, 
aL(Xi,XE)  =  0, 
AA;j  A, =  AE 
where  L(Xi,X)  gives firm  i's loss as a function  of its interval  between  price 
changes and the common  interval  of other firms.  Using the formula  for 
the loss function, equation 6, and assuming  without loss of generality 
thatpi is set at time zero, we can write  L(Xi,X)  as 
in years). We then consider q(s;A)  for s  =  0, h, 2h, ... .  T -  2h, T -  h, where h =  1/52; 
thus  we divide  time  into periods  of a week. We  begin  by setting  all  of these q(sj;X)'s  to one. 
New values  are  found  by substituting  this initial  guess into the right-hand  side of equation 
A.7. An integral  from r =  0 to r =  nh is approximated  by averaging  the values of the 
integral  for r = h, 2h  .  ...  (n -  1)h  and  then  multiplying  by nh. (As described  below, we 
consider only values of A  that are integral  multiples  of h.) The new q(si;A)'s  are then 
substituted  back into equation  A.7, and another  set of values is computed.  We continue 
this  process  until  the mean  of the absolute  changes  in the q(s,;X)'s  from  one iteration  to the 
next is less than 6, 6 = 0.00002. In all cases the algorithm  appeared  to converge to the 
solution  without  difficulty. 
63. We approximate  the integral  using  the procedure  described  in note 62. 64  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1988 
(A.10)  L(xi,x)  F+  A-K  E[pi*(s)-pi]2ds. 
Xi  Xi 2j 
Differentiating  equation  A. 10  with respect  to Xi  and  evaluating  at Xi  =, 
we find 
_  _  _  ~~  ~~F  11  I 
(A.11)  aL(X~~~~,X)  -  KfEL.~~p  ~I(S)  -pJ]2dS  ax(  X  =  x  X2  X2  2 
?  A2-KE[pI(X)  -  pJ]2. 
(The Envelope Theorem  allows us to eliminate  the term 
--K-  E [p  (s)  -  p]2  dsj}  <-  from  ( 
Xi 2  (3pi  0  Ia, 
because the firm  chooses pi optimally  given Xi,  the effect of the marginal 
change  in  pi when Xi  changes  on the objective  function  is zero.) 
Evaluating  equation A.  11 requires that we find E  [pi*(s) -  p1J2  for 
0 ?  s  <  X. Equations A.  1 and A.2 imply that the deviation of pi from 
Q(O),  the average  of prices set at the same time as  pi, is Oi(O).  Thus, using 
the solution  for Q(t)  (equations  A.6 and A.8), we obtain 
X  r0 
(A.12)  Pi=  (g-i)-?  +I  q(r;X)dZ(-r) + Oi(O).  2  =0 
Substituting  the solution for p(t), equation A.9, the process for x(t), 
equation  8, and the identity  y = x -  p into the formula  forpi*,  equation 
5, we obtain 
CO 
(A.13)  pi(s)  =  (g-L)s  +  f  [v+(1-v)w(r;X)]dZ(s-r)  +  Oi(s). 
r=0 
Finally,  equations  A. 12  and  A. 13  lead to 
(A. 14)  E [pi(s)  -  p]2  =  (g_)  (S  -  X)2  +  SC2u 
2  S 
+  Crxu  [v + (1  -  v)w(r;X)]2  dr 
?  f  =O 
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where we have used the fact that  changes in Z and  in Oi  are uncorrelated 
both over time and  with each other. 
We can now solve numerically  for the equilibrium  value of X. We 
begin  by guessing  a value  of X.  After  finding  q(.;X)  and  w(*;X)  as described 
above, we evaluate equation A. 14 numerically  for s between 0 and X. 
We then use these results to evaluate  the derivative  in equation  A. 11. If 
the derivative  is negative, so the representative  firm  can reduce its loss 
by increasing  its interval  between price changes, we raise our guess of 
X; if the derivative is positive, we reduce X. We continue until the 
derivative  converges to zero.64 
64. We find  E[p*(s) -  p]2  for s = 0,  h, 21i  ....  -  zh,  X,  where, as before,  h =  1/52. 
Since we assume  q(r;A)  1 for r 2  T, and  thus  I(r;A)  -  for r 2 T +  X,  we truncate  the 
second  integral  in equation  A. 14  at r = T+ X.  Otherwise  the integrals  in equation  A. 14  and 
equation  A. 1  are  approximated  as described  above. We stop when  we find  an n such  that 
equation  A.ll  is negative for X =  nh and positive for X =  (n +  1)h; we then set X at 
whichever  value yielded  the smaller  absolute  value  of equation  A. 11.  All of the functions 
involved  appeared  to be well-behaved  and  convergence  occurred  without  difficulty. Comments 
and Discussion 
George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  Rose, and  Janet Yellen: The  Ball, Mankiw, 
Romer  paper  makes  several  contributions.  First, it provides  an excellent 
survey of the new Keynesian macroeconomics. Second, it develops 
further  the implications  of menu cost theory and thereby devises an 
ingenious test of the Keynesian model against  the new classical alter- 
native. The new classical economics and  also real  business-cycle  theory 
are  based  on the dual  assumptions  of rational  expectations  and  continual 
market  clearing.  As a result,  according  to these theories, unemployment 
is voluntary, and anticipated  money shocks have no real effects. The 
new Keynesian economics is particularly  welcome because it makes 
common sense and, unlike the new classical theory, it fits the most 
important  stylized facts of the business cycle: that cyclical unemploy- 
ment  is largely  involuntary  and  that  anticipated  demand  shocks do affect 
real  output. 
The purported  advantage  of the new classical theory  over Keynesian 
theory  was  its greater  theoretical  coherence.  Economists  found  it  difficult 
to build  "optimizing  models" in which  money shocks, if anticipated,  are 
not neutral;  and they have found it equally difficult  to explain theoreti- 
cally how there can be equilibria  in which labor markets  do not clear. 
But these theoretical  difficulties,  which revealed  more  about  the lack of 
imagination  of economists than about  the functioning  of the real world, 
have now been solved.  Efficiency wage models explain why labor 
markets  need  not  clear.  The  menu  cost-near-rationality  models  surveyed 
by the authors show that small transactions  costs (or rule of thumb 
behavior  that  imposes second-order  losses on its practitioners)  result  in 
significant  monetary nonneutrality.  As a result, changes in monetary 
policy, even if expected, may result in changes in equilibrium  output 
and employment.  This development  is important  because it means that 
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the Keynesian  assumption  that  has been pejoratively  labeled  as "money 
illusion"  involves no gross departure  from  rationality. 
The authors not only survey this literature;  they take it one step 
further.  Lucas's classic paper  "Some International  Evidence  on Output- 
Inflation  Tradeoffs"  derives one implication  of the Lucas-Phelps  equi- 
librium model of  the economy: the response of  real output to  an 
innovation  in the growth  rate of nominal  GNP-T-should  decline with 
the variance  of aggregate  demand shocks.' Alternatively,  the Phillips 
curve  relating  unemployment  to unanticipated  inflation  should  be steeper 
for countries  where the variance  of aggregate  demand  shocks is larger. 
In a dramatic  example,  Lucas showed  thatT  for  the United  States, where 
inflation  is low, is 10 times its value for Argentina,  where inflation  is 
high.2 
Ball, Mankiw,  and  Romer  have shown that  a menu  cost theory of the 
frequency  of price changes yields the identical  prediction  of a steeper 
Phillips  curve (a smaller  value of T) as the variance  of nominal  income 
changes  increases. In addition,  however, menu  cost theory  predicts  that 
increases in the level of inflation,  or the mean rate of nominal  income 
growth, should steepen the Phillips curve. Why? With staggered  con- 
tracts,  the higher  the rate  of inflation,  the greater  is the cost of infrequent 
price changes (since relative prices get out of line more rapidly).  As a 
result,  with  menu  costs, the optimal  frequency  of price  changes  increases 
as the inflation  rate  rises. And  the greater  the  frequency  of price  changes, 
the steeper the Phillips curve. The authors thus show that Lucas's 
observations  are consistent with new Keynesian theory, but that new 
Keynesian  theory  generates  an additional  implication  as well: the slope 
of the Phillips  curve should become steeper (T should fall) as inflation 
rises, for a given variance  in nominal  demand.  The theory  is well worked 
out and  coincides  with common  sense. For example, indexation  became 
more prevalent in the United States as inflation  rose; countries with 
higher  average  inflation  appear  to have greater  indexation  of contracts. 
It may be useful to mention,  at least parenthetically,  that equilibrium 
models  of the business cycle have already  failed many  tests. First, quits 
1. Robert  E. Lucas, Jr., "Some International  Evidence on Output-Inflation  Trade- 
offs," American  Economic  Review, vol. 63 (June  1973),  pp. 326-34. 
2. See, for example,  Richard  T. Froyen and Roger  N. Wurd,  "Further  International 
Evidence on Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs," American  Economic Review,  vol. 70 (June 
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rise and vacancies decline as the unemployment  rate falls. On average, 
people appear  to value theirjobs more  highly  in bad times than in good. 
as is exactly consistent with the Keynesian view that sticky nominal 
wages cause johs to pay higher rents in cyclical downturns than in 
expansions. Second, the demand  shocks of World  War  II, the Vietnam 
War, and Mrs. Thatcher's successful policy of disinflation,  as well as 
Mr.  Volcker's similar  policy, all produced  changes  in equilibrium  output 
long after the policies were announced  (and seen to be credible). The 
changes persisted sufficiently  long after their announcement  that it is 
extraordinarily  difficult  to believe that the changes in employment  and 
OutpLut  they caused were due to the slow propagation  of unanticipated 
shocks, as would be consistent  with Lucas's explanation. 
The authors' contribution  is to give an additional  test of the Lucas 
model-a  test that is in Lucas's exact framework.  It depends on being 
able to differentiate  the effect on the steepness of the Phillips  curve that 
is due to the variance  in nominal  GNP  growth  from  the effect that  results 
from  the level of inflation.  Unfortunately,  these two variables  are highly 
correlated  (the correlation  equals 0.92). In addition, the slopes of the 
Phillips curves for different countries are difficult to estimate. As a 
consequence, the authors'  test is inevitably  a weak test of their theory 
against  Lucas's theory, as well as against  other  Keynesian  alternatives. 
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer face three types of problems in their 
empirical analysis. First, there are difficulties in the way that they 
estimate the output-inflation  trade-off  for a given country. Second, the 
way in which they model the dependency of T on inflation and the 
volatility  of nominal  income  growth  across  countries  is also problematic. 
Finally,  their  interpretation  of the results  may  not be the only admissible 
explanation;  there may be other  reasons why the output-inflation  trade- 
off varies across countries. 
A number  of problems potentially affect equation 14, the equation 
used to generate  estimates  of the output-inflation  trade-off.  Most impor- 
tant,  T is treated  as a constant,  when in fact it probably  varies over time. 
Also, there is reason to believe that different  Phillips  curves specifica- 
tions would  generate  different  estimates  of r. 
The authors'  regressions,  at least in one respect, fail to correspond  to 
their theory. They assume that Ti is constant  for each country i in the 
regressions  used to estimate the Phillips  curve slope. A more accurate 
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over time. In each period,  Ti depends  on the expected inflation  rate and 
the  variance  of inflation  in  the  country  at  that  time.  Realistically,  expected 
inflation  and the volatility of nominal  GNP growth have probably  not 
been constant during  the sample  period in most countries;  indeed, this 
is the original  motivation  for Engle's work on ARCH (autoregressive 
conditional  heteroscedasticity).A 
If the conditional  mean  and  variance  of nominal  demand  growth  were 
not constant  over time, then the optimal  interval  between  price changes 
would also have changed in each country over time; consequently, T 
could not be treated  as a constant  for a given country.  Quar  terly  postwar 
U.S. inflation  is an extremely  autoregressive  variable  (the Q-test  for the 
hypothesis of a flat twelfth-order  correlogram  is over 350). Cecchetti 
provides evidence for the United States that suggests that as inflation 
and the mean expected rate of inflation  rose during  the seventies, the 
interval  between price  changes  fell.4 
If  one assumes  that  expected  inflation  in  each  country  was not  constant 
over the sample  period, a more natural  way of estimating  ux  might  be to 
use the standard  deviation  of the residual  in an autoregression  predicting 
Ax. Grubb,  Jackman,  and Layard  have calculated  such a measure  of ux 
for a subsample  of Ball, Mankiw,  and Romer's countries  by taking  the 
residual  variance  in an AR(2) predicting  Ax. Their measure  of uAx  has a 
correlation  of only 0.27 with the authors'  estimate  of ux. 
The Phillips  curve can be estimated in many ways. One would like 
the estimates of Ti to be insensitive to precise specification. Grubb, 
Jackman,  and  Layard  have estimated  an  alternative  measure  of the slope 
of the Phillips  curve using a model that distinguishes  between real and 
nominal  wage  rigidity.5  The correlation  of their  measure  of nominal  wage 
rigidity  and Ball, Mankiw,  and Romer's measure  of Ti across countries 
is 0.30. This suggests that the theoretical constructs needed for the 
authors'  test are both difficult  to pinpoint  and sensitive to a wide range 
3.  Robert F. Engle,  "Autoregressive  Conditional Heteroskedasticity  with Estimates 
of the Variance of United  Kingdom Inflations,"  Econoinetr-ica, vol.  50 (July 1982), pp. 
987-1007. 
4.  Stephen  G.  Cecchetti,  "The  Frequency  of  Price  Adjustment:  A  Study  of  the 
Newsstand  Prices of Magazines,"  Jolurnal of Econiometrics, vol.  31 (August  1986), pp. 
255-74. 
5.  Dennis  Grubb, Richard Jackman,  and Richard Layard,  "Wage Rigidity and Un- 
employment  in OECD  Countries,"  Eluropean Economic  Review,  vol.  21 (March-April 
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of specification  choices (we should note, however, that when equation 
5.6 is estimated  using  the measures  of Grubb,  Jackman,  and  Layard,  the 
authors'  conclusions still obtain). It also suggests that a more efficient 
way to estimate T would be to estimate equation 14 pooling the data 
across both countries  and  time, using, for example, a fixed-effects  panel 
data estimator;  this would also alleviate problems  with low degrees of 
freedom. Further,  the dependency of Ti on Ti  and uj, could be nested 
directly  within  equation  14. 
Nonlinearity plays a significant  role in the authors' second-stage 
regressions between T and Tr  (among other variables). It is therefore 
worth noting that the functional form of equation 14 implies that the 
short-run  Phillips curve relating the inflation  rate to the level  of real 
output  is concave rather  than  convex, as is commonly  assumed.  That  is, 
according to equation 14 the short-run  Phillips curve is assumed to 
become flatter  rather  than steeper  as Y  rises. 
Many macroeconomists  have worried recently about unit roots in 
macroeconomic  time series. While  it is hard  to believe that  A\x  has a unit 
root (standard  Dickey-Fuller  tests easily reject the hypothesis  for post- 
war quarterly  American  data), many  economists (Mankiw  among  them) 
have shown that the behavior of real output is consistent with the 
existence of a unit root. Unless the lagged dependent variable has a 
coefficient  of unity in equation 14, the unit root in real output  implies a 
random walk residual term in equation 14. If this residual, which 
presumably  represents  "unimportant"  omitted  variables,  is not orthog- 
onal to Ax, then estimates  of T  will be biased and inconsistent. 
The authors'  equation  5.6 models the variation  of T across countries 
as a function of the average values over time of  iT and Ux  and their 
squares.  The authors  include  the squares  so that  Ti  can depend  on Ti  and 
uxi  in a nonlinear  fashion; however, this choice of functional  form has 
several  unfortunate  consequences. In particular,  for moderate  values of 
1Ti,  the relationship between Ti  and Tir  is ambiguous and generates negative 
fitted values for Ti,  so that the quadratic  functional form is not very 
successful, either in generating  a negative monotonic relationship  be- 
tween  T and  iT  or in preventing the prediction of a negative Ti. Further, 
the effects of innovations  in u,  are insignificant  and incorrectly  signed. 
However, the quadratic  functional  form  seems to be critical  in establish- 
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The functional  form that the authors use to relate aT  and T has the 
disturbing  property  that the relationship  between aT  and T potentially 
changes sign, while theory suggests an unambiguous  negative relation 
between these two variables. When the authors  estimate equation 5.6 
for only the OECD countries without Iceland, it is worrisome  to note 
that  the sign of dTIdr  turns  positive at a 7.2 percent  inflation  rate, which 
is very close to the midpoint  of inflation  for the OECD sample (with 
Iceland,  the sign becomes positive at 9.2 percent  inflation). 
A related  problem  concerning  the specification  of equation  5.6 is that 
the fitted value of T reported  in table 8 is negative for an inflation  rate 
between 10  percent  and  15  percent.  The  variable  T is presumably  positive, 
despite the fact that in the sample,  T is estimated  to be negative  for one- 
quarter  of the countries;  the posited  nonnegativity  of T also suggests  that 
equation  5.6 should have been estimated  using some sort of Tobit-like 
procedure,  incorporating  the fact that T is measured  with error (Tobit 
cannot be used without modification,  given the presence of negative  Ti 
terms). 
The authors  argue  for the inclusion of the square  terms in equation 
5.6 because  T is always  positive and  therefore  the  T equation  should  have 
a nonlinear  form.  A comparison  of equations  5.6 and  5.5 and  of equations 
5.3 and 5.2 shows how very important  including  the quadratic  inflation 
term  is in establishing  the statistical  relevance  of inflation  for  7.  For the 
results to be considered robust, alternative nonlinear specifications 
should  also yield the result  that aT  has a significant  effect on T. Perhaps  a 
simpler  nonlinear  form  consistent  with the nonnegativity  of T would be: 
1  /T =  a  +  b-1T  +  CUA. 
We estimated  this equation  with their data and obtained  the following 
results  (with standard  errors  in parentheses): 
1/7 =  8.95  -  621rr +  806ux 
(2.5)  (416)  (536) 
=  0.06; standard error =  111; number of observations  =  43. 
Note that  the coefficient  of aT  is statistically  insignificant  and  also has the 
wrong  sign. The F-test of the hypothesis  that inflation  and  its square  do 
not enter the regression  when both ox and its square  are included  also 
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The precision  with which T  is estimated  in equation  14  varies  country 
by country;  however, all  Ti  observations  are  weighted  equally  in equation 
5.6. The resulting  heteroskedasticity  in equation  5.6 leads to inefficient 
estimates, and also could lead one to conclude, for example, that aT  is 
significant  in equation  5.6, when in fact it is not. 
The authors  interpret  their finding  of a negative relation  between T 
and aT  as reflecting  more frequent  price changes due to menu costs at 
higher  levels of inflation.  Alternative  interpretations  are possible. For 
example, Keynesian theory has traditionally assumed that Phillips 
curves become steeper as the economy approaches  full employment 
because nominal  wages are sticky downward  but  not upward.  Countries 
with high values of inflation  may be those with more of a taste for high 
employment, and therefore may have been more frequently on the 
steeper part of the short-run  Phillips curve. Implicitly, the authors 
assume  that  their  countries  were at the natural  rate  of unemployment  on 
average  over the sample  period, so that  differences  in T  across countries 
reflect changes in the Phillips  curve slope at the same level of output. 
This assumption  may be particularly  difficult  to maintain  in the shorter 
periods. Movements along a given Phillips  curve, rather  than shifts of 
Phillips  curves, may explain  why the authors  find  a correlation  between 
changes in inflation  and changes in steepness of Phillips  curves in the 
period  through  1972  and  the post-1972  period. 
The  country-by-country  changes  in  the steepness  of the  Phillips  curves 
(countries  with greater  increases  in inflation  had  greater  increases  in the 
Phillips  curve  slope)  are  perfectly  consistent  with  the authors'  hypothesis 
that  higher  inflation  induces  more  frequent  price  changes. But the period 
through  1972  and  the post-1972  period  were quite different  structurally, 
and  other  explanations  abound.  Not only were  there  increases  in inflation 
between the two periods, but also in the later period there were more 
supply  shocks, less dependence  on fixed exchange  rates, a rise and  then 
leveling off of developing country debt, a rise in developed country 
unemployment,  and slower productivity  growth. Any of these factors 
could impart a bias to the correlation between Ti and ai if it has a 
differential  impact on countries with different rates of inflation. For 
example,  the switch  from  fixed  to floating  exchange  rates  can  be expected 
to shift and perhaps  steepen the Phillips  curve. With  fixed rates, wage 
earners may be restrained  in their bargaining  by the thought that an 
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tionary  demand  policies. It is extremely  unlikely  that  the data  will allow 
us to discriminate  between the hypothesis  of menu  costs and  alternative 
explanations  for the changes  in T. 
An important  assumption  of the authors'  test is that Ax is a process 
that can be considered to be exogenous in equation 14. Clearly this 
assumption  is special. If LAx  is correlated  with the error  term  in equation 
14-that  is, if changes in nominal  demand  are correlated  with supply 
shocks-biases  will be generated  in the estimation  of the T'S  (the slopes 
of the Phillips  curves). The authors  have argued  that there is no special 
reason for such biases to occur since there is no particular  reason for 
any bias in the 's  to be correlated  with mean  inflation. 
The only way to see whether such a bias is likely, or likely to be 
serious, is to propose an alternative  model, to see whether significant 
simultaneity  bias will occur, and  to test whether  the model  fits the data. 
We shall therefore consider an alternative  model in which income is 
purely  random,  so that there is no Phillips  curve by construction.  Not 
only does such a model generate  the correlations  found by the authors; 
in fact, it offers a superior  explanation  of the data. 
Suppose that real income in country i is a white noise process (so 
there  is no Phillips  curve whatsoever): 
Yit =  Eit  Eit -  iid (0,  i 
Assume that  inflation  is also a white noise process, independent  of e: 
sTit =  N  i,  -,  iid (0,  r2i). 
Then 
AXit  =  IT  it  +AY  =  Nit  +  E  it  E jit  I. 
If one runs  the regression: 
Yit=  Ax1,, 
the plim of Ti  is: 
Ti=  ?/(2fi`  +  T  )  - 
Clearly,  Ti gives, even asymptotically,  a biased estimate of the respon- 
siveness of real output  to an innovation  in nominal  GNP growth,  which 
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author's  variable  aoi  (the standard  deviation  of Ax in country  i) since a2i 
is just 2Vx?  + o2i, and also (negatively)  on osi, the standard  deviation  of 
the inflation  rate in country i. However, Ti does not depend on Tri,  the 
mean  inflation  rate  in country  i. 
Consider,  however, the slightly  modified  process: 
sit= 
- 
ri +  nit  nit  iid (0, o2i). 
In this case, the estimates of Ti will be unchanged. If  4'i and Tri  are 
positively correlated, regressions of Ti on  -ri  and o,i will likely yield a 
negative coefficient on  ,Ti, because of its positive correlation  with the 
omitted  variable  or  i. Such a positive correlation  between 4,  i and -ri  is in 
fact consistent with the authors'  data, for which the sample  correlation 
of Triand 4Ti  is 0.92. 
A test of the authors'  process against  the null hypothesis postulated 
here (in which there  is no Phillips  curve) can be conducted  by including 
both Tri  and  cir, in equation  5.6. The example  just presented  implies  that 
the coefficient  on cir should  be negative  and  the coefficient  on Tri  should 
be zero; the opposite is true  if the authors'  hypothesis  is relevant. 
In fact,  adding cir, and o.2i to the authors'  key regression  (equation 
5.6) shows the two new variables to be  very significant while the 
coefficients  of Iri and its square  are insignificant: 
T  =  0.  441 - 0.3  3  21 + 0.181 7Tr2  + 25.58cr  48.48CF2  - 27.42cr  + 49.93cr' 
(0.09)  (2.08)  (3.79)  (5.67)  (24.62)  (5.93)  (22.81) 
R2 = 0.592;  standard  error  = 0.175;  number  of observations  = 43. 
The F-test of the hypothesis  that  the coefficients  of as  and CF2  are  both 
zero is resoundingly rejected  [F(2, 35)  =  11.5]. On the other hand the 
F-test of the hypothesis that both the Tr  term and its square  are zero is 
quite consistent with the data [F(2,  35) =  0.05]. Note the dramatic 
improvement  in the fit of the equation  in comparison  with the authors' 
equation  5.6. Parenthetically,  both the authors' results in table 11 and 
Lucas's results are similarly  affected  by inclusion  of ars (and  its square, 
where relevant). 
We do not wish to say that  we prefer  our null  hypothesis  to that  of the 
authors. We find their theory plausible and their tests consistent with 
the theory. We only wish to point  out that  their  test is weak. Our  example 
shows that  one could believe that  T is actually  independent  of Tr,  yet still 
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The authors  have provided  an extremely  clear  and  valuable  survey of 
the new Keynesian  microeconomic  foundations.  They have also devel- 
oped an interesting  hypothesis  regarding  the frequency  of price changes 
in new Keynesian models. The faster prices rise, the more frequently 
prices are changed, and hence the smaller  the real effects of nominal 
demand shocks; the output-inflation  trade-off should be negatively 
affected  by the rate  of inflation. 
The prediction  is intuitively  believable and testable with microeco- 
nomic  data. We are sympathetic  with  both  the spirit  and  the conclusions 
of this paper. However, aggregate  data  just do not seem to discriminate 
between the hypothesis of interest  and very different  alternatives.  This 
does not indicate that the authors  are incorrect;  it merely shows how 
ambiguous  the results  of aggregate  regressions  tests of subtle  hypotheses 
almost  always are. 
Christopher A.  Sims: Laurence Ball, Gregory Mankiw, and David 
Romcr  discuss a developing  literature  that aims at making  price rigidity 
and money illusion  respectable  again  in macroeconomics.  Anyone who 
has bought  from  a catalog  or served  on a university  departmental  salary- 
setting committee knows the world is full of price rigidity  and money 
illusion. It is therefore  important  to find a way to let macroeconomists 
discuss it without  embarrassment. 
Nonetheless I disagree  with some of the assessments in the paper  as 
to what has been achieved in this line of work and as to what the most 
promising  lines of advance are. Part  of my disagreement  stems from a 
different view of how Keynesian economics and its market-clearing 
rational expectations antithesis succeeded. The paper asserts that 
Keynesian  economics fell into disrepute  because it could not provide  a 
justification  based on optimizing  behavior for its assumption  of price 
rigidity.  This has the matter  almost backwards.  It is one of the accom- 
plishments  of Keynesian economics and a main reason for its original 
appeal  that  it proceeded  boldly  to legitimize  money  illusion  and  nonclear- 
ing markets  as primitive  assumptions  in economic models. At the time 
it was obvious not only that these things existed, but that they were 
quantitatively  important  to the functioning  of the economy. The  fact that 
microeconomics then had no way to discuss them was a reason for 
rejecting  any insistence that macroeconomics  be built up from micro- 
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economics  that  it does not make  a fetish of modeling  based  on optimizing 
behavior. 
Rational  expectations macroeconomics  put at center stage the reac- 
tion of people to the uncertainty  in their economic environment.  While 
Keynes wrote at length  about  the importance  and volatility  of expecta- 
tions, he paid little attention to the endogeneity of price and wage 
expectations. In the high-inflation,  high-unemployinent  environment  of 
the 1970s, it became clear that endogeneity  of expectations, always as 
evidetnt  to the naked eye as money illusion, was also quantitatively 
important to  macroeconomics. Precisely the nominal rigidities that 
Keynesianism  legitimized  as primitive  assumptions  seemed  to be shifting 
in response to policy as rational  expectations  theory suggested. 
But like Keynesianism's  strategy  of freely postulating  price  rigidities, 
rational  expectations'  coherent  tracing  out  of the implications  of dynamic 
optimization  under  uncertainty  is both its central  strength  and its main 
weakness. It is still as obvious that  people do not dynamically  optimize 
as it was when Keynes wrote. And while rational  expectations could 
explain  why unemployment  could rise even in the presence of inflation, 
it could not explain  why it should  have stayed so high  for so long, either 
recently  or during  the Great  Depression. 
Keynesianism  declined because it failed to offer a true explanation 
about  how nominal  rigidities  respond  to the economic environment,  not 
because it failed to offer an explanation  based on optimizing  behavior. 
It may not be the time yet for a new wave in macroeconomic  theory, 
but if it is, I expect that it will come from rediscovering  the Keynesian 
willingness  to confront  irrationality  and  market  failure,  while restricting 
the license Keynesianism  seems to give to ad hockery.  This will require 
going beyond rational expectations, to  consider the technology of 
calculation  and communication.  Useful theory that really does this is 
not yet available. However, the idea of models in which individual 
behavior deviates from rationality  in amounts  and directions  that cost 
the individual  little is in this spirit  and  is promising. 
From  this  point  of view, a new Keynesian  model  should  be confronted 
with three  questions. Where  is the irrationality  in the model?  Why  there 
and  not somewhere  else? Would  this suboptimal  behavior  plausibly  hold 
still under  the shifts in environment  that are being considered?  Unlike 
the authors,  1 view it as no particular  virtue  that  irrationality  be confined 
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calculating  machines  in every other respect. It is a virtue, though,  for a 
model to make  explicit how its irrationality  shifts or disappears  when it 
becomes costly. 
I don't think  the authors'  model  does very well by these tests. It takes 
as an unexamined  assumption  the idea that  it is costly to change  the level 
of prices. My view is that  this is true  in low-inflation  economies because 
of the convenience in relying on aggregate  price stability in making 
contracts.  But  if there  were such a thing  as an economy with a rock-solid 
inflation  rate  of 40 percent,  plus  or minus  2 percent,  per  year, institutions 
would surely adapt, so that prices would be announced  in catalogs and 
wage contracts  with smooth  growth  paths  paralleling  the smooth  aggre- 
gate price path. Nominal rigidity  would set in about this price path in 
much the same form as we see around  the zero inflation  rate in low- 
inflation  economies. 
The data  presented  by the authors  in fact provide  no support  at all for 
their  claim that the level of inflation  affects the degree of price rigidity. 
The central  problem  is that the leading alternatives  to their theory all 
agree  that the variability of inflation  should  be related  to the strength  of 
the relation  beween nominal  and  real  output.  In the authors'  sample,  the 
standard  deviation  and the level of inflation  have a correlation  of 0.92. 
The question is then whether they have found anything  more than the 
tendency-expected  from neoclassical equilibrium  theories-for  econ- 
omies with  highly  variable  inflation  to have a lower  regression  coefficient 
for output  on aggregate  demand. 
The authors  put aside any direct test of this proposition  by pointing 
to the identity,  equation  16,  in the paper.  The equation  shows that  in any 
given country,  T  can be found as a function  of c2,  c2,  and  a third  number 
E-2.  However, this identity does not imply any identity in the relation 
between  , c2,  and  C2,  because there is no more reason to suppose that 
2 
CE  is constant  across  countries  than  that  any  of the other  terms  in  equation 
16 is constant. The authors are right in pointing out that if rr  has no 
additional  explanatory  power once both Ca) and C2  are entered in the 
regression,  their  theory  can accommodate  that  result  by postulating  that 
"supply shocks" (E in the paper's  equation 15) have the same variance 
in all countries.  But the proposition  does not seem particularly  attractive 
a priori. 
I have verified  that in both equations 11.6 and 5.6 the addition  of the 
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inflation  statistically  insignificant  at any reasonable significance  level. 
Thus there is no statistical evidence for a relation of T to -r, once the 
effects of c( and  Cw are both accounted  for. The data  are consistent with 
fairly large effects of  i- in such a regression, because of  the high 
collinearity  of rr  with ar,  but they give more significant  coefficients to 
the other  variables  than  to rr.  The authors  are  then consistent  in claiming 
that  there  is no strong  evidence against  their  theory  in the data, but  there 
is also no evidence in favor of it for anyone who believes that the 
variability  of inflation  affects the response  of output  to demand. 
The authors argue that there is no plausible theory that suggests T 
should be a function  of both ux and uc. There are really two classes of 
modern market-clearing  theories with which to compare the authors' 
model. One, "Lucas I," is represented  by Robert Lucas's 1973  paper 
mentioned  by the authors.  That  model suggests  that  high  variance  in the 
aggregate  price level, by making  it more difficult  to distinguish  relative 
price movements, reduces the response of output to a given change in 
the aggregate  price level. Because in that theory the basic relationship 
is between  the aggregate  price  level and  aggregate  output,  the coefficient 
in a regression  of output growth on nominal  output growth would be 
expected to vary with the variance  of inflation. 
The other class of alternative  theories, represented  by a 1987  paper 
by Lucas and Nancy Stokey, suggests that only anticipated  changes in 
the price  level (which  influence  nominal  interest  rates)  have real  effects, 
and that  unanticipated  variation  in rnoney  stock is reflected  one-for-one 
in unanticipated  variation in prices that has no causal influence on 
output.  I This latter  type of theory probably  best represents  the generic 
implication  of rational  expectations. Rational  expectations models can 
deliver  the "Lucas I" type of causal effect of nominal  surprises  on real 
variables  only by sustaining  differences  in information  across agents in 
the economy in equilibrium.  This requires  special assumptions  difficult 
to justify from  the rational  expectations  perspective. 
Correlations  between prices and  output  could take varying  forms  in a 
Lucas-Stokey  type of model, and certainly  in this type of model  T  could 
depend on both ox and uc. Unpredictable  monetary  policy fluctuations 
would generate  price variation  with no corresponding  real fluctuations. 
1. Robert  E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, "Money and Interest  in a Cash-in- 
advance  Economy,"  Econometrica,  vol. 55 (May 1987),  pp. 491-513. Laurence  Ball,  N.  Gregory Mankiiw, and David Rowler  79 
A simple  version of such a model, then, might  have real  output  approx- 
imately a random  walk and price level an independent  random  walk. 
(The random  walk behavior of prices would emerge if the monetary 
authority  aimed at stabilizing  the inflation  rate, but did so erratically.) 
Since nominal  aggregate  demand  in the Ball-Mankiw-Romer  data  is price 
change plus output  change, this simple model would imply in equation 
14  that y = 0, A = 1, and  T =  U2/o-'.  Regression  of the authors'  estimated 
's  on a constant and the "theoretical"  yl/ux  alone produces an R2 of 
0.74, compared with a maximum  R2 in table 5 of 0.39. This highly 
simplified  classical theory can be rejected  as an exact theory by further 
tests, but it is a reasonable  rough  approximation.  There appears  to be 
correlation  of price variability  with output variability,  in other words, 
that is consistent with more complicated  market-clearing  theories, but 
there  is no evidence of deviation  from  the simple  theory  in the direction 
favored  by the authors-dependence of Tor uc on -r. 
General Discussion 
Several panelists questioned the menu cost  explanation of price 
stickiness. Martin  Baily suggested  that  menu  costs are  fixed  costs, much 
like advertising.  Therefore  large  firms,  for  example  firms  in concentrated 
industries,  have the most to gain by paying  the mienu  cost and adjusting 
their  price. Yet a reading  of the mernu  cost literature  would lead one to 
the opposite conclusion-that  firms  in a concenltrated  industry  do not 
have flexible  prices because their  profit  function  is flat  for a wide range 
around  their  optimum  price. Baily also felt that  a menu  cost model  could 
not explain why prices adjust  quickly to changes in costs, as they did 
when  oil prices  rose in 1973,  but  not to changes  in demand.  He suggested 
that a model was needed to explain sticky markups  of price over cost 
rather  than sticky prices. Robert Gordon suggested that menu costs 
could not easily explain  the stickiness of prices in mail  order  catalogues 
where  the menu  cost is clearly  the cost of printing  a catalog.  That  cost is 
the same however many prices are changed. Yet, typically, only some 
fraction  of prices  are  changed  in successive issues of a catalog,  suggesting 
that something  other  than  menu  costs is keeping  prices sticky. 
Robert Hall acknowledged that the evidence on the stickiness of 
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are much more flexible. No one buys a car without haggling  over the 
price, and department  store prices can be changed  every day. Thus he 
was skeptical  that  the U.S. economy  can be characterized  as a collection 
of firms  that set price and meet demand  at that price. Gordon  felt that 
Arthur  Okun's  distinction  between auction  markets  and markets  with a 
preset price  had  been overlooked  in the authors'  paper.  He thought  that 
the examples Hall had in mind would lie  somewhere between the 
extremes  identified  by Okun. 
There  was general  discussion  of the distinction  between two types of 
models of sticky wage and price dynamics:  the periodic-review  model 
and the continuous-review  model in which the time intervals  between 
price or wage changes are random.  John Taylor's wage model is of the 
periodic type in which, because of administrative  costs,  wages are 
changed  at fixed intervals.  Taylor  found that the average  fixed interval 
between wage setting is 12 months, asynchronized  across firms. The 
authors' menu cost model is of this type, but with the length of the 
periodic review determined endogenously. The Caplin and Spulber 
model  is an  example  of the continuous-review  type; a firm  raises  its price 
whenever it gets a certain distance away from the profit-maximizing 
level. Robert  Hall argued  that  the Caplin-Spulber  model is more  natural 
than the authors'  model, and, in sharp  contrast, generates  neutrality  of 
money. The average  price level increases in proportion  to the increase 
in money, as larger  price increases by some firms  are  just balanced  by 
unchanged prices in other firms. Hall felt that the authors' model 
dismisses  this neutrality  result  by an  ad  hoc assumption  that  firms  change 
prices at fixed intervals.  Ball replied  that a model with fixed timing  was 
more  realistic, since wages are almost  always adjusted  at fixed intervals 
and, according  to Rotemberg's  findings,  prices are most often adjusted 
in January.  He also noted that the Caplin  and Spulber  neutrality  results 
required  rather  strong  assumptions,  such  as uncorrelated  money  shocks. 
Gordon  cited Arthur  Okun's  evidence that  FIFO  pricing  is more  popular 
than  LIFO  pricing  as evidence that  there  are  large  costs to management's 
continuously  overseeing price  changes. 
Edmund Phelps noted that the empirical evidence in the authors' 
paper  showing  that  prices are changed  more  frequently  in high-inflation 
countries  is consistent with either type of model. He saw no advantage 
to the more  complicated,  endogenous-interval  menu  cost models  of wage 
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comparatively  low. According to Phelps both models have the same 
failing: they do not explain why wage and price indexing is not more 
common. 
Hall  remarked  that  the authors'  model  was an "old Keynesian"  model 
as opposed to the new Keynesian model of Greenwald  and Stiglitz  also 
in  this  volume.  The  Ball-Mankiw-Romer  model  emphasizes  rigid  nominal 
prices  that  make  monetary  disturbances  the driving  force of the business 
cycle. The Greenwald  and Stiglitz  model  assumes many  disturbances  to 
the system and emphasizes  how these disturbances  get amplified  by the 
structure  of the economy. Monetary  nonneutrality  enters into the new 
Keynesian model only through possible distributional  effects.  Hall 
preferred  this type of model because he found it unrealistic  to assume 
that  prices are rigid. 
Ball disagreed  with Christopher  Sims's comment  that the success of 
Keynesian economics comes from acknowledging  irrational  behavior. 
Ball argued  that, as emphasized  by Akerlof  and Yellen, new Keynesian 
models give the insight that a very little irrationality  can produce 
Keynesian  results. The amplification  of a little irrationality  is due to an 
externality in the pricing  decision of a monopolistic competitor. It is 
often the case that a firm  gains little by lowering  its price unilaterally  in 
response to weak demand, because the increased profits  from greater 
sales are almost completely offset by the loss from the lower price. 
However, through  the real balance  effect, demand  at a given price, and 
hence the firm's profits, would be increased substantially  if all other 
firms  would lower their  price. Baily noted that this argument  that hrms 
are more  likely to lower their  price  if other  firms  lower theirs  is contrary 
to the standard  model of the firm in an oligopolistic industry. The 
representative  firm in such an industry will make more profits from 
lowering  its price if other firms  in the industry  do not change theirs. If 
the firms  in the authors'  model are reinterpreted  as industries,  with the 
externalities  being between industries, firms  in an industry  have to be 
regarded  as colluding  perfectly. 
James Tobin felt that many of the participants  in the current  debate 
about  menu  costs misrepresent  Keynes and  Keynesian  economics. Both 
Keynes and the classical economists with whom he debated acknowl- 
edged that the economy would often be driven out of equilibrium  by 
shocks  to aggregate  demand.  That  is, neither  side believed  in a Walrasian 
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markets. The issue that divided Keynes and the classical economists 
was whether  the market  mechanisms  of prices, wages, and  interest  rates 
could return  the economy to a full-employment  equilibrium  in a reason- 
able time. Keynes believed the market mechanism  would be slow at 
best, and  only one of his reasons  involved  nominal  wages that  are sticky 
downward.  The more  important  reason  is that real aggregate  demand  is 
neutral  to the level of prices  and  wages. The  real  balance  effect countered 
the second explanation,  but the effect of falling  prices on real interest 
rates could easily cancel out the real balance  effect. Tobin  doubted  that 
the Depression  would have ended sooner if prices and  wages had fallen 
even faster. Explaining  rigid  wages and prices is therefore  not the most 
important  task of Keynesian  macroeconomics. 
There were several comments on the labor market  in the authors' 
model. Hall emphasized Ball and Romer's earlier finding that real 
rigidities,  such as an elastic labor  supply  locus, are crucial  for the effect 
of small  menu  costs to be amplified.  He felt that  it was misleading  for the 
authors  to criticize  Barro's  assumption  that  labor  supply  is elastic, when 
they required  an elastic supply locus themselves. They should have 
criticized  Barro  for assuming  a competitive  labor  market,  which makes 
elastic labor supply implausible, whereas the efficiency wage model 
generates  elastic supply  quite naturally. 
Baily questioned  how it was possible that the costs to firms  of price 
or wage rigidities  could be small if they resulted in layoffs and unem- 
ployment  of their workers. Assuming  that there is a large  gap between 
the wage and  the value of time to an unemployed  worker,  there  is a first- 
order  loss if firms  do not cut their  wage and  price  with a shift in demand. 
Baily reasoned that wage rigidity  is not evidence against this being a 
large cost; if wages and employment  are part of an implicit contract, 
firms  that do not adjust  their prices so as to maintain  employment  will 
have to compensate  workers  with a higher  expected wage. 